arXiv Computation and Language By Yu-Yu Yang, Ti-Rong Wu, Hung Guei, Hsing-Yu Chen, I-Chen Wu

Do LLMs Trust the Accuser or the Accusation? Measuring Belief Shifts in Werewolf

Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →

The paper introduces a belief‑shift evaluation benchmark for large language models (LLMs) using the social‑deduction game Werewolf. By annotating suspicion and accusation messages in LLM‑played games, the authors measure how a village‑side model’s beliefs change after each message, evaluating 40 open‑weight LLMs on 1,224 annotated messages. Results show that larger models better distinguish wolves from villagers, yet accusations still heavily sway beliefs, especially when the accuser is trusted, and even when the accuser is wolf‑aligned. "whyItMatters":"The study highlights that current open‑weight LLMs up to 120B parameters still struggle to integrate accusation content with source trust in strategic communication, revealing limitations in their belief‑updating capabilities in complex social contexts."

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv Computation and Language.

arXiv AI
Sep 1

QUACK: Questioning, Understanding, and Auditing Communicated Knowledge in Multimodal Social Deduction Agents

arXiv:2605.27068v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Social deduction games have become a popular testbed for probing reasoning, deception, coordination, and belief modeling in Large Language Mo...

By Ye Yuan, Rui Song, Weien Li, Zeyu Li, Haochen Liu, Xiangyu Kong, Changjiang Han, Yonghan Yang, Zichen Zhao, Zixuan Dong, Fuyuan Lyu, Bowei He, Haolun Wu, Jikun Kang, Xue Liu
arXiv AI
Sep 21

Why Do LLMs Struggle in Strategic Play? Broken Links Between Observations, Beliefs, and Actions

The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.

By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu