Hugging Face Trending Papers

Mitigating Agentic Deception via Evaluation-Side Partially Observable Games

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The paper proposes a new framework, Evaluation‑Side Partially Observable Extensive Form Game (e‑PoG), to mitigate deceptive behavior in large language model agents. By modeling the interaction as a max‑min game between an agent, a monitor, and a verifier, the authors define a Subgame‑Perfect Oversight Equilibrium (SPOE) and prove its existence. Experiments on Gemma3‑4B‑IT and Qwen3‑4B/8B across several tasks show that e‑PoG reduces deception by up to 26.0% and improves task success by up to 39.8% compared to existing baselines.

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