Item Response Theory for AI Safety
arXiv:2608. 05086v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models differ in how safely they behave and these differences are measured by safety benchmarks.
The paper investigates whether the HELM Safety benchmark’s HarmBench dataset measures a single attribute—harmful refusal—using psychometric methods. Multidimensional item response theory indicates HarmBench does not capture a single attribute, and differential item functioning reveals that models from different developers score items differently, suggesting domain‑specific effects. The authors conclude that safety scores should only be used for attribute comparison after confirming single‑attribute validity, warning that aggregated scores can mask saturation and conflated behaviors.
arXiv:2608. 05086v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models differ in how safely they behave and these differences are measured by safety benchmarks.
arXiv:2605. 17173v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models exhibit safety degradation in non-English languages.
arXiv:2606. 30219v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM evaluation and AI safety face a shared measurement problem: benchmark scores, reward-model signals, and reported safety metrics can improve while the latent properties they are meant to represent remain difficult to verify.
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly support science, but they can also convert hazardous scientific knowledge into actionable misuse guidance. Existing benchmarks often rely on templated queries disconnected from real-world hazards, and employ LLM-as-a-Judge paradigms without domain grounding.
arXiv:2607. 18665v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly support science, but they can also convert hazardous scientific knowledge into actionable misuse guidance.
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
arXiv:2610.14443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model cards, system cards, and safety reports increasingly document LLM safety behaviors, yet safety evaluations typically start from predefined benc...
arXiv:2605. 05427v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Refusal rates are a poor proxy for LLM safety, i.
arXiv:2606. 30256v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety benchmarks often buy scalability by fixing the prompt, the language, and the turn structure.
DeepSafe‑SciHazard introduces a real‑world‑grounded benchmark for measuring scientific safety risks, comprising 2,400 hazardous and 600 oversafety questions across 12 disciplines. It defines a decomposed harm scoring system, DeHarm‑Score, that evaluates query severity, refusal behavior, and response‑level risk, further breaking down harm into executability and net‑new risk. An expert‑validation study shows DeHarm‑Score aligns 90.17% better with expert judgments than the best baseline, and the benchmark reveals that deep research agents score 32.3% higher on mean DeHarm‑Score than standard LLMs, highlighting a critical blind spot in current safety defenses.
The paper demonstrates that Item Response Theory (IRT) can uncover meaningful structure in safety benchmarks for language models, allowing adaptive item selection to approximate full benchmark rankings with Spearman’s ρ > 0.90 while cutting evaluation costs by at least 80% and up to 99.9% on some suites. It also proposes a static method to extract a small, informative subset of items that can be reused across models, achieving 80–99.8% cost savings. These findings show that psychometric techniques can make safety evaluation more efficient without sacrificing ranking accuracy.
arXiv:2607. 07916v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models exhibit recurring behavioural patterns -- personas -- that shape generalisation and safety, but we lack reliable tools for decomposing, measuring, and controlling them.