arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
By Katharina Deckenbach, Haritz Puerto, Jonas Geiping, Sahar Abdelnabi
arXiv:2607. 01153v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task.
By Brett Reynolds
The paper introduces a deterministic AI security risk assessment framework that transforms diverse engineering artefacts into a standardized Control ID taxonomy scored on a four‑level ordinal scale. It compiles technique‑level predicates from a fixed MITRE ATLAS snapshot, linking each control to mitigation and producing traceable feasibility and impact outputs. The framework is formally verified for boundedness, totality, consistency, and monotonicity, and is evaluated on five open‑source AI projects, showing that strengthened controls lower feasibility scores while residual risks persist when core controls are missing.
By Yixuan Huang (University of Southampton, Southampton, UK), Basel Halak (University of Southampton, Southampton, UK), Boojoong Kang (University of Southampton, Southampton, UK)
arXiv:2607. 01153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model has followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, resisted an embedded command, or misreported progress in an agentic task.
By Brett Reynolds
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
By Serhii Zabolotnii
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
By Harry Owiredu-Ashley