arXiv AI By Katharina Deckenbach, Haritz Puerto, Jonas Geiping, Sahar Abdelnabi

Models That Know How Evaluations Are Designed Score Safer

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arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.

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arXiv AI
Jul 2

Adversarial Pragmatics for AI Safety Evaluation: A Benchmark for Instruction Conflict, Embedded Commands, and Policy Ambiguity

arXiv:2607. 01153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model has followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, resisted an embedded command, or misreported progress in an agentic task.

By Brett Reynolds
arXiv AI
Aug 6

Item Response Theory for AI Safety

arXiv:2608. 05086v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models differ in how safely they behave and these differences are measured by safety benchmarks.

By Joshua Fonseca Rivera (Independent), Neil Shah (Independent), David Demitri Africa (UK AI Security Institute), Konstantinos Voudouris (UK AI Security Institute)
arXiv AI
Jul 31

Adversarial Pragmatics for AI Safety Evaluation: A Diagnostic Framework and Seed Benchmark for Language-Mediated Control

arXiv:2607. 01153v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, or misreported progress in an agentic task.

By Brett Reynolds
arXiv AI
Sep 17

Beyond Routine Compliance: Cunning Data Cultivates Safety Vigilance in Large Language Models

The paper introduces "cunning questions"—non‑safety prompts that contain misleading premises or subtle inconsistencies—to train large language models (LLMs) to scrutinize underlying intent and assumptions. Experiments show that incorporating these questions improves robustness against out‑of‑distribution jailbreak attacks and enhances subsequent safety fine‑tuning, achieving a new state‑of‑the‑art reduction in mean ASR from 17.40% to 15.05% across nine backbone–benchmark combinations. The authors argue that this training fosters vigilance, enabling models to prioritize safety judgments before engaging in harmful planning.

By Youjia Wang, Lin Xu, Yang Sun, Yuxiao Lu, Chengfang Fang, Jie Shi
arXiv AI
Aug 19

Benchmarking the Benchmarks: Evaluating Automated Safety Benchmarks for Small Language Models

The paper investigates whether existing AI safety benchmarks, designed for large language models, are suitable for evaluating small language models (SLMs). By testing five benchmark suites on 26 open‑source SLMs with a unified scoring rubric, the authors find that ambiguous judgments dominate, especially for complex prompts and certain architectures. This ambiguity, linked to factors like lexical density and output perplexity, undermines the reliability of aggregate leaderboards and reveals a confound between model capability and perceived safety.

By Nyamtulla Shaik, Fengjun Li, Bo Luo