arXiv Machine Learning

Side-Channel Attacks Bypass Protection in 3D Printers

arXiv:2606. 13952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Active Motor Noise Cancellation (AMNC) ships in commercial fused deposition modeling (FDM) 3D printers as a hardware countermeasure against acoustic side-channel attacks that target intellectual property (IP).

arXiv AI
Oct 16

BiShield-TEE: On the (In-)Security of Unilateral Weight Obfuscation in On-Device TEE-Shielded LLM Partition

The paper introduces BiShield-TEE, a bilateral obfuscation framework for on-device large language models that jointly transforms input and output dimensions to create ambiguous solutions, thereby protecting the model from reverse engineering. It identifies a vulnerability in existing unilateral obfuscation methods—called the Solution Determinacy Property (SDP)—which allows attackers to recover the model’s true key and achieve high attack accuracy. Experiments demonstrate that BiShield-TEE limits attack success to the baseline black‑box level while improving inference efficiency on real hardware.

By Zhiyuan Wang, Yuezhi Zhou, Ziqi Zhang, Zhu Zhang, Zhixing Tan, Yongheng Deng
arXiv Machine Learning
Oct 9

Power Side-Channel Membership Inference Attack on Embedded Machine Learning

The paper introduces PSCMIA, a power side‑channel membership inference attack that can determine whether a data sample was used to train an embedded machine learning model by analyzing power traces, without needing prediction probabilities or labels. The authors evaluate PSCMIA on MNIST, FMNIST, CIFAR10, and CINIC10 datasets using fully connected and convolutional neural networks on STM32F3 and XMEGA platforms, achieving ROC‑AUC values up to 0.907 for fully connected models and close performance to probability‑vector attacks for CNNs. PSCMIA outperforms label‑only attacks in 11 of 16 configurations, showing that physical execution can leak membership information even when conventional outputs are suppressed.

By Sahan Sanjaya, Prabhat Mishra
arXiv AI
Sep 12

Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA): A Black-box Adversarial Attack against Voice Authentication and Anti-Spoofing Systems

The paper introduces the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a black‑box adversarial technique that subtly alters inaudible frequency regions of AI‑generated audio to fool voice authentication systems and their countermeasures. Experiments show SMIA achieves at least 82% success against combined verification and countermeasure systems, 97.5% against standalone speaker verification, and 100% against countermeasures, revealing a critical security gap. The authors argue that current static defenses are inadequate and call for dynamic, context‑aware defenses that can adapt to evolving threats.

By Kamel Kamel, Hridoy Sankar Dutta, Keshav Sood, Sunil Aryal
arXiv AI
Aug 20

Low-Power, Neuromorphic, Acoustic Anomaly Detection for Persistent Machine Monitoring

The paper presents an autoencoder-based acoustic anomaly detection system implemented on Intel’s Loihi 2 neuromorphic processor. It achieves high detection performance—0.9959 AUC on a clean ToyADMOS ToyCar benchmark and 0.7990 source AUC on a noisy DCASE 2026 Task 2 ToyCar benchmark—while operating with only 0.0406–0.0426 mJ of dynamic energy per sample, far below CPU and GPU baselines. The system demonstrates that low‑power, on‑chip inference is feasible for persistent machine monitoring.

By Steven C. Nesbit (Information Sciences, CAI-3, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, USA), Victor M. Vergara (AeroVironment Inc., Albuquerque, USA), Michael A. Felix (University of New Mexico COSMIAC Research Center, Albuquerque, USA), Evan T. Kain (Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, USA), Luis R. Garc\'ia Carrillo (Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, USA), Gerd J. Kunde (Nuclear and Particle Physics and Applications, P-3, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, USA), Andrew T. Sornborger (Information Sciences, CAI-3, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, USA)