arXiv Machine Learning

Backdooring Acoustic Foundation Models for Physically Realizable Triggers

arXiv AI
Sep 3

Backdoor Attacks on Speech Emotion Recognition via TTS-Generated Poisoning

The paper investigates poisoning-based backdoor attacks on Speech Emotion Recognition (SER) systems that use self‑supervised acoustic representations. It introduces a stealthy, low‑energy acoustic trigger that can be embedded imperceptibly into both natural and synthetic speech, enabling scalable poisoning. Experiments show high attack success rates with low poisoning ratios, cross‑model transferability, and a particular vulnerability of self‑supervised representations, highlighting the lowered barrier to effective backdoor attacks via TTS technology.

By Yongbin Huang, Xihao Xie, Jia Zhang
arXiv AI
Sep 12

Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA): A Black-box Adversarial Attack against Voice Authentication and Anti-Spoofing Systems

The paper introduces the Spectral Masking and Interpolation Attack (SMIA), a black‑box adversarial technique that subtly alters inaudible frequency regions of AI‑generated audio to fool voice authentication systems and their countermeasures. Experiments show SMIA achieves at least 82% success against combined verification and countermeasure systems, 97.5% against standalone speaker verification, and 100% against countermeasures, revealing a critical security gap. The authors argue that current static defenses are inadequate and call for dynamic, context‑aware defenses that can adapt to evolving threats.

By Kamel Kamel, Hridoy Sankar Dutta, Keshav Sood, Sunil Aryal
arXiv AI
Aug 20

`From Prompt to Perturbation': An Adaptive Framework for Voice-Based Jailbreaks on Audio LLMs

The paper introduces an adaptive jailbreak attack framework that evaluates both cascaded pipelines and end‑to‑end large audio‑language models (LALMs) under a unified setting. It employs a feedback‑guided mutation engine to automatically generate and refine jailbreak candidates across textual prompts and audio perturbations, thereby broadening attack diversity. Experiments on six audio‑based systems show that both paradigms remain highly vulnerable, with the framework achieving higher attack success rates than existing methods.

By Linghan Huang, Bo Li, Huaming Chen, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 11

SpecGuard: Inference-Time Backdoor Detection For Free

SpecGuard is an inference‑time backdoor detector that leverages speculative decoding—using a small draft model to propose tokens and a target model to verify them—without adding extra model computation. By monitoring the draft‑token acceptance rate, SpecGuard detects when a target model shifts toward attacker‑controlled behavior while the draft model does not, signaling a backdoor trigger. The method reliably identifies a range of backdoor types, including stealthy attacks that bypass input‑level filters, across multiple model families.

By Rui Wen, Ahmed Salem, Andrew Paverd, Mark Russinovich, Zheng Li