The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) correctly gauge their confidence when acting in a hidden‑information chess variant. In experiments where the location of a hidden royal piece is repeatedly relocated, the models’ stated probabilities about the piece’s position were almost never accurate at high confidence levels, with a calibration deficit concentrated in those high‑confidence events. Across multiple model configurations and providers, the same pattern emerged, and conventional evaluation metrics such as legality, cost, latency, and completion rate were found to be uncorrelated with belief quality, yet a model could still win the game despite poor confidence estimates.
By Bhushan Kashinath Joshi
Agentic systems increasingly gate actions on a model's own stated confidence, which assumes confidence tracks correctness at the moment of acting. We test this in a hidden-information chess variant wh...
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
By Yoshua Bengio, Oliver Richardson, Tom\'a\v{s} Gaven\v{c}iak, Michael Cohen, Rory Svarc, Damiano Fornasiere, Gael Gendron, David Hyland, Aton Kamanda, Adam Oberman, Francis Rhys Ward, Anna Gaven\v{c}iak, Jacob Livingston Slosser, Vincent Mai, Iulian Serban, Joumana Ghosn
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
The paper presents an agent designed for the GLEE Competition that engages in bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion games against human and AI opponents. The agent combines a classical game‑theoretic solver, an online Bayesian layer for estimating opponent archetypes, and a language model for generating messages. Experiments include 13,200 Monte Carlo games against 11 synthetic archetypes, an ablation study of the opponent‑modeling layer, and an analysis of 9,337 live‑game messages showing a strong correlation between moral rhetoric framing and buyer purchase decisions.
By Hayden Arnold
arXiv:2610.33011v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: While recent advances in autonomous agents enable them to coordinate on increasingly complex tasks, prior work shows that this growing capacity for c...
By Eric Onyame, Runtao Zhou, Kowshik Thopalli, Bhavya Kailkhura, Chirag Agarwal
arXiv:2607. 15434v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another.
By Jasmine Brazilek, Maheep Chaudhary, Zoe Lu, Miles Tidmarsh
arXiv:2606. 03034v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another.
By Gaurav Naresh Mittal
The paper investigates how an informed adversary can influence the optimal signal in a constrained signalling channel. It finds that the adversary‑robust optimum aligns with the salience pole on most items, differing only on a small subset where the salience‑to‑Bayes coordinate is undefined. The study demonstrates that as the adversary’s persuasion budget increases, the optimal signal shifts from a posterior‑maximizing to a margin‑maximizing strategy, and provides a diagnostic check for evaluating adversary‑awareness.
By Cris Huynh
arXiv:2606. 14923v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As language-model agents increasingly work in teams, each agent must decide how much to trust its teammates.
By Yujiao Chen
The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.
By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu
arXiv:2610.18614v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Controlling an acting LLM agent means deciding, at each step of a long-horizon task, whether to trust its next action, abstain, or hand off to a human....
By Ashutosh Hathidara