The paper introduces LLM‑Auction, a learning‑based generative auction mechanism that integrates ad allocation with large language model (LLM) generation. It redefines the auction object from discrete ad slots to distributions over LLM outputs, aligning allocation with advertiser value and user experience while inherently modeling allocation externalities without extra inference cost. The authors prove allocation monotonicity and continuity, show a first‑price payment rule has favorable incentive properties, and demonstrate state‑of‑the‑art allocation efficiency in a simulated LLM‑as‑a‑judge environment.
arXiv:2608. 00123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-native advertising embeds sponsored content directly into model-generated responses, shifting the unit of sale from a fixed slot to a moment within an evolving conversation.
arXiv:2604. 05845v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Auto-bidding services optimize real-time bidding strategies for advertisers under key performance indicator (KPI) constraints such as target return on investment and budget.
arXiv:2610.34917v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Diffusion models enable multiple advertisers to compete for exposure within a shared generated image. Yet existing approaches are computationally costl...
Diffusion models enable multiple advertisers to compete for exposure within a shared generated image. Yet existing approaches are computationally costly when generating images under varying target-sha...
The paper introduces the Latent Advertiser Mixture Auction (LAMA), a token‑level advertising framework that integrates advertiser influence directly into the text generation process. Advertisers provide local continuation values that shape next‑token policies, and the platform decodes these through a latent mixture while updating an allocation posterior. LAMA is shown to satisfy Markov DSIC and IR, achieve near‑optimal KL‑regularized welfare, and, in proof‑of‑concept experiments on commercial‑search queries, improve platform welfare and revenue without compromising user‑facing response quality.
arXiv:2607. 27265v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Real-time bidding is central to computational advertising, comprising three elements: Supply Side Platform (SSP) selling ad impressions, Demand Side Platform (DSP) bidding for advertisers, and Ad Exchange conducting auctions between them.
arXiv:2610.09985v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study a sequential pricing problem in which a seller jointly posts a price and an advertisement generated by a large language model (LLM). The sel...
arXiv:2610.14473v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose a new framework for banner ad auctions, leveraging diffusion models to allow for multiple bidders to co-win a single banner ad opportunity...
The paper tackles the data market design problem, which seeks signaling schemes that maximize revenue for an information seller. It applies deep learning to learn these schemes, addressing both obedience and incentive constraints, and demonstrates that the framework can replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex scenarios, and suggest new optimal designs. The study builds on prior auction‑design work and introduces a novel approach for revenue‑optimal data markets.
The paper proposes an inference auction for large language model (LLM) APIs, enabling users to bid for faster service when compute demand exceeds capacity. The auction allocates priority efficiently without increasing latency, and includes fast algorithms for truthful bidding and an autobidding agent that adjusts bids within a user’s budget to maximize utility. Experiments show the auction improves system welfare while preserving the cache utilization and latency benefits of the SGLang inference framework.
arXiv:2304. 14385v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework in which a seller not only sets the product price but also designs flexible advertising schemes to influence customers' valuations of the product.
The paper presents a reinforcement learning framework for training autonomous large language model agents to act as sellers in multi-product bargaining markets. It models the problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process and introduces a structured message protocol to map natural language into a regulated decision space. Using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards, the trained agents match limited inventory to buyers more effectively, achieving seller surplus extraction and allocation quality comparable to or better than trillion‑parameter models, and generalize to unseen market conditions.