arXiv AI

Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report

arXiv:2606. 12429v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Muse Spark is the latest large language model developed by Meta.

arXiv AI
Sep 23

Controlling risks of AI in chemical science with agents

arXiv:2312.06632v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Artificial intelligence is rapidly advancing scientific discovery, but this progress carries risks of misuse, such as the creation of harmful subst...

By Jiyan He, Haoxiang Guan, Weitao Feng, Yaosen Min, Jingwei Yi, Kunsheng Tang, Shuai Li, Jie Zhang, Kejiang Chen, Wenbo Zhou, Xing Xie, Weiming Zhang, Nenghai Yu, Shuxin Zheng
arXiv AI
Sep 3

FUSE: An Evaluating Framework for Dangerous Capabilities of LLMs

The paper introduces FUSE, a modular framework that evaluates large language models (LLMs) for dangerous capabilities across three orthogonal pipelines: Knowledge (K), Defense (D), and Harm (H). Using a chemical‑biological module, the authors assess 12 commercial LLMs, revealing divergent profiles among models and families, and showing that newer models increase knowledge while only partially improving defense. The framework’s reliability is supported by high cross‑judge consistency and low inter‑pipeline correlations.

By Zhengyi Jin, Ru Zhang, Xiao Chen, Xinbo Liu, Jiaxuan Lin, Jia Huang, Jianyi Liu, Zhen Yang
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 17

SciRisk-Bench: A Risk-Dimension-Aware Benchmark for AI4Science Safety

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in AI for Science (AI4Science) workflows, from scientific question answering and literature analysis to laboratory planning and autonomous discovery. This progress creates an urgent need for safety benchmarks that evaluate not only scientific competence, but also whether models recognize and avoid risks in high-stakes scientific contexts.

Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 20

An Early Warning of Emerging Biosecurity Risks in Frontier LLMs

Frontier large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into scientific workflows, yet their growing biological capabilities may outpace current safeguards. To assess the biological risks of frontier models, we develop Intern-BioBreaker, a specialized bio-red-teaming model, together with an integrated computational-to-physical framework that couples model-level stress testing with wet-lab validation.

arXiv AI
Jun 18

SciRisk-Bench: A Risk-Dimension-Aware Benchmark for AI4Science Safety

arXiv:2606. 18936v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in AI for Science (AI4Science) workflows, from scientific question answering and literature analysis to laboratory planning and autonomous discovery.

By Linghao Feng, Yinqian Sun, Dongqi Liang, Sicheng Shen, Chenfei Yan, Yuxuan Peng, Yilin Zhao, Haibo Tong, Kai Li, FeiFei Zhao, Yi Zeng
arXiv AI
Jul 20

Harmonizing AI Safety Thresholds

arXiv:2607. 16112v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies.

By Wilber Sean Anterola, Matthew Ball, Luis F. Lafuerza, Markov Grey
arXiv AI
Jun 19

Measuring Biological Capabilities and Risks of AI Agents

arXiv:2606. 19899v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks.

By Patricia Paskov, Jeffrey Lee, Kyle Brady, Alyssa Worland
arXiv AI
Aug 5

A Blind Spot in Alignment: Quantifying Biosecurity Risks in Large Language Models

arXiv:2608. 02684v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are accelerating biological research, yet this same capability poses a critical biosecurity threat: models that assist in protein engineering can equally be prompted to generate predicted toxin-like sequences, potentially lowering the barrier to biological misuse.

By Shu Quan, Tianfang Hao, Sitong Fang, He Geng, Jiayi Zhou, Boyuan Chen, Kaile Wang, Donghai Hong, Juntao Dai, Yaodong Yang, Jiaming Ji