Low-Resource Safety Failures Are Action Failures, Not Representation Failures
arXiv:2606. 01196v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment learned in high-resource languages transfers poorly to low-resource languages.
The study investigates how safety alignment in large language models, trained mainly in English, transfers to other languages. While models show near-perfect harmfulness detection (AUROC > 0.98) using unrelated harmless prompts (easy negatives), performance drops sharply in low‑resource languages when using surface‑similar benign prompts (hard negatives). This degradation persists across multiple languages and models, indicating that easy‑negative evaluation alone cannot confirm cross‑lingual harmfulness representation quality.
arXiv:2606. 01196v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment learned in high-resource languages transfers poorly to low-resource languages.
arXiv:2605. 17173v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models exhibit safety degradation in non-English languages.
The paper introduces Latent Space Refusal Anchoring (LSR‑Anchoring), a training‑free technique that extracts a refusal direction from English prompts and applies it to the residual stream of instruction‑tuned models at inference time. The primary variant, Mean‑Activation Steering (MAS), works across several architectures (Llama‑3‑8B, Llama‑3.1‑70B, Mistral‑7B‑Instruct, Qwen2.5‑7B), restoring safety for low‑resource African languages with minimal performance loss, while a refined SAE‑Derived Steering (SDS) further reduces KL divergence without degrading legitimate prompt performance. The method shows positive transfer for Yoruba, Igbo, Igala, and Hausa, but fails for Arabic, suggesting a geometric mismatch rather than a data scarcity issue.
Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is largely developed in English, assuming these safeguards generalize across multilingual settings. However, this assumption remains underexplored and exposes a vulnerability in low-resource languages.
arXiv:2608. 08032v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in multilingual models is uneven: a model that reliably refuses a harmful request in English will often comply with the same request in a lower-resource language.
arXiv:2608. 11583v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models is often treated as a distributed property of the entire network, yet its practical brittleness suggests that refusal behavior may be concentrated in a smaller set of parameters.
arXiv:2607. 10112v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models remains brittle across languages: prompts reliably refused in English can elicit harmful compliance in non-English and low-resource settings.
arXiv:2606. 08451v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models often exhibit sycophancy, which is the tendency to affirm users' opinions regardless of factual accuracy.
arXiv:2510. 22014v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Discrete optimization-based jailbreaking attacks on large language models aim to generate short, nonsensical suffixes that, when appended onto input prompts, elicit disallowed content.
arXiv:2606. 28843v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-tuning a large language model is a ubiquitous method for enhancing its capability on a specific downstream task.
arXiv:2609.14861v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A deployed language model may refuse a harmful request in English yet comply with its faithful translation, revealing a cross-lingual safety failure...
arXiv:2605. 25420v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model safety evaluation remains heavily English-centered, leaving low-resource languages under-measured even when models are deployed globally.