arXiv:2510. 22014v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Discrete optimization-based jailbreaking attacks on large language models aim to generate short, nonsensical suffixes that, when appended onto input prompts, elicit disallowed content.
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arXiv:2606. 28153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood.
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
arXiv:2607. 08883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral alignment in large language models often masks fragile internal safety representations.
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
arXiv:2608. 11583v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models is often treated as a distributed property of the entire network, yet its practical brittleness suggests that refusal behavior may be concentrated in a smaller set of parameters.
arXiv:2606. 05958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Activation steering has become a popular way to control Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without fine-tuning.