Low-Resource Safety Failures Are Action Failures, Not Representation Failures
arXiv:2606. 01196v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment learned in high-resource languages transfers poorly to low-resource languages.
arXiv:2608. 08032v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in multilingual models is uneven: a model that reliably refuses a harmful request in English will often comply with the same request in a lower-resource language.
arXiv:2606. 01196v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment learned in high-resource languages transfers poorly to low-resource languages.
arXiv:2608. 17744v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Take three frontier mixture-of-experts models (Alibaba, OpenAI, NVIDIA; 3.
arXiv:2602. 06941v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models can recover mid-generation from task-misaligned activation steering, producing explicit verbal restarts (e.
When a tool-using agent is given the same task in a different language, does it still take the same steps? Multilingual evaluation rarely asks: it compares final answers and discards the actions.
arXiv:2608. 09095v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Uncovering the internal mechanisms underlying the safety capabilities of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for developing trustworthy artificial intelligence.
arXiv:2607. 14552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors.
arXiv:2604. 04385v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We localize the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models.
arXiv:2608. 05163v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common assumption holds that switching to a non-English language makes a multilingual RAG system easier to attack for personal information.
arXiv:2608. 03842v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a language model fails on surface-perturbed input (typos, OCR noise, homophones), "which layer is responsible" has three natural operationalizations: where representations diverge most (sensitivity), where restoring clean activations recovers the prediction (causality), and where a small adapter can repair the damage (compensatory capacity) - and we show these three layer maps dissociate.
arXiv:2608. 11583v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models is often treated as a distributed property of the entire network, yet its practical brittleness suggests that refusal behavior may be concentrated in a smaller set of parameters.
arXiv:2607. 25907v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation steering controls model behavior by editing internal activations at inference time.
arXiv:2606. 15420v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A constitution tells a language model what to value, but little tells us whether it does.