arXiv:2609.07147v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Federated learning, as a privacy-preserving distributed machine learning paradigm, faces significant threats from backdoor attacks. Compared to central...
By Jian Wang, Hong Shen, Wei Ke, Xue Hua Liu
arXiv:2606. 09548v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) allows a set of clients to collectively train a global model without sharing local training data.
By Bastien Vuillod, Kevin Hector, Pierre-Alain Moellic, Jean-Max Dutertre, Olivier Potin
arXiv:2608. 06637v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Robust aggregation methods are widely used in federated learning to mitigate the impact of adversarial client behavior.
By Srinivasan Subramanian, Md. Abdullah Al Hafiz Khan, Kazi Aminul Islam
arXiv:2608.21137v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) promises trust-free collaborative learning by replacing the centralized parameter server with peer-to-peer model...
By Mouhamed Amine Bouchiha, Gregory Blanc, Yufei Han
arXiv:2606. 25858v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning is vulnerable to backdoor attacks in which malicious clients inject poisoned updates while preserving benign-task performance.
By Kavindu Herath, Joshua C. Zhao, Saurabh Bagchi
arXiv:2608. 07274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split Federated Learning (SFL) facilitates privacy-preserving collaborative training with reduced client-side overhead.
By Yuhan Xie, Jingrong Huang, Chen Lyu
arXiv:2606. 17035v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior research suggests that differential privacy (DP) inherently enhances the robustness of federated learning (FL) against backdoor attacks.
By Xiaolin Li, Ning Wang, Ninghui Li, Wenhai Sun
FedLNS is a server‑side framework that screens federated learning updates by representing each client’s contribution through changes in trainable normalization‑layer parameters, creating lightweight signatures that can be compared against a history‑aware cross‑client reference. The method requires no extra client‑to‑server communication, raw data, or labeled attack examples, and after screening, the remaining full‑model updates are aggregated with standard federated learning rules. Experiments on GPT‑style, BERT‑style, and LLaMA‑style models with 200 clients demonstrate that FedLNS achieves lower test perplexity than six baselines even when 40% of the population performs target manipulation under both IID and non‑IID data partitions.
By Kai Li, Jong-Ik Park, Carlee Joe-Wong, Wei Ni, Falko Dressler
The paper demonstrates that a single poisoned data point can successfully create a backdoor in linear models and ReLU neural networks without needing detailed knowledge of the training data. It establishes provable conditions under which this one‑poison attack works with high probability, achieving zero backdooring error while leaving the model’s normal performance largely unaffected. The attack relies only on coarse geometric bounds of the input space and training parameters.
By Thorsten Peinemann, Paula Arnold, Sebastian Berndt, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi
The paper introduces Checkerboard, a clean‑label backdoor attack that uses a closed‑form, data‑independent trigger design based on an input‑space Fisher‑separability objective and a ridge four‑neighbor local‑smoothness prior. This approach yields a pixel‑wise checkerboard trigger without requiring data access, surrogate model training, or iterative optimization, and it outperforms existing norm‑bounded clean‑label attacks across four benchmark datasets. On CIFAR‑10, poisoning 20 samples with a 10/255 perturbation achieves a 95.72% attack success rate, while on IN‑100 a 0.4% global poisoning rate yields over 83% ASR without harming clean accuracy, and the attack remains robust against state‑of‑the‑art defenses.
By Yi Yang, Jinyang Huang, Binbin Liu, Feng-Qi Cui, Xiaokang Zhou, Haiming Jin, Zhi Liu, Jie Zhang, Meng Li
arXiv:2601. 07177v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) addresses privacy and data-silo issues in the training of large language models (LLMs).
By Mingxiang Tao, Yu Tian, Wenxuan Tu, Yue Yang, Xue Yang, Xiangyan Tang
arXiv:2607. 05748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning.
By Qi Zhao, Christian Wressnegger