arXiv:2606. 17035v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior research suggests that differential privacy (DP) inherently enhances the robustness of federated learning (FL) against backdoor attacks.
By Xiaolin Li, Ning Wang, Ninghui Li, Wenhai Sun
arXiv:2509. 11974v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training among clients without centralising data, making it a widely adopted privacy-enhancing technology (PET).
By Soumia Zohra El Mestari, Maciej Krzysztof Zuziak, Gabriele Lenzini
arXiv:2511. 13749v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which are small, carefully crafted inputs that lead to incorrect predictions.
By Ci Lin, Tet Yeap, Iluju Kiringa
Backdoor attacks compromise training data so that a model retains clean accuracy but predicts an attacker-chosen target on triggered inputs. At very low poisoning rates, only a few samples convey the trigger--target association, making poison-sample selection critical.
arXiv:2607. 07314v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself.
By Chongkai Li, Bang Zhang, Wenjian Luo
arXiv:2606. 31742v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Explainable AI (XAI) methods have demonstrated significant success in recent years at identifying relevant features in input data that drive deep learning model decisions, enhancing interpretability for users.
By Maximilian Andreas Hoefler, Karsten Mueller, Wojciech Samek
arXiv:2507. 05113v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison training data to implant backdoor into the victim model.
By Binyan Xu, Fan Yang, Xilin Dai, Di Tang, Kehuan Zhang
arXiv:2608. 00732v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep neural networks, especially when training relies on third-party data, allowing adversaries to inject malicious behaviors through data poisoning.
By Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing, Jinwen Zhong
Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself. Recently, centralized Taking Away Training Data (TATD) attacks have shown that malicious training could abuse the memorization capacity of deep models to store and later recover training data.
arXiv:2607. 23394v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work shows that fine-tuning language models on even a small amount of poisoned data can install targeted misbehavior, and ostensibly benign data can transmit hidden preferences that generalize broadly.
By Adhyyan Narang, Artin Tajdini, Claire Zhang, Jamie Morgenstern
arXiv:2606. 17110v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models are increasingly trained on proprietary or sensitive data, from private healthcare and financial records to user conversations containing secrets.
By Md Abdullah Al Mamun, Ngoc Phu Doan, Pedram Zaree, Ihsen Alouani, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh
arXiv:2601. 07177v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) addresses privacy and data-silo issues in the training of large language models (LLMs).
By Mingxiang Tao, Yu Tian, Wenxuan Tu, Yue Yang, Xue Yang, Xiangyan Tang