arXiv:2608. 00732v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep neural networks, especially when training relies on third-party data, allowing adversaries to inject malicious behaviors through data poisoning.
By Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing, Jinwen Zhong
arXiv:2606. 19023v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The growing reliance on pre-trained Machine Learning (ML) models has introduced new attack surfaces.
By Gabriele Digregorio, Marco Di Gennaro, Francesco Pastore, Stefano Zanero, Stefano Longari, Michele Carminati
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2606. 03344v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model merging composes specialized capabilities into a single LLM by aggregating task vectors sourced from unverified public platforms, exposing a critical supply-chain attack surface: Because any malicious behavior can be encoded into a task vector, and merging grants third-party vectors direct write access to model weights, an attacker-provided task vector can enable or amplify diverse downstream threats.
By Jinghuai Zhang, Yetian He, Kunlin Cai, Han Zhao, Fnu Suya, Yuan Tian
arXiv:2608. 12962v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables organizations holding complementary features of shared entities to collaborate and train models.
By Ziqi Zhao, Jialin Lu, Junjie Shan, Junyuan Zhang, Shuya Yang, Ka-Ho Chow
Model merging composes specialized capabilities into a single LLM by aggregating task vectors sourced from unverified public platforms, exposing a critical supply-chain attack surface: Because any malicious behavior can be encoded into a task vector, and merging grants third-party vectors direct write access to model weights, an attacker-provided task vector can enable or amplify diverse downstream threats. Prior work studies only backdoor attacks against model merging for classifiers using static arithmetic heuristics, which fail to effectively handle diverse attacks on generative LLMs for three reasons.
arXiv:2608. 01095v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning (FL) enables multiple intelligent devices to collaboratively train a high-accuracy model without sharing raw data.
By Hongliang Zhang, Zhongyuan Yu, Fenghua Xu, Teng Hu, Jian Meng, Jiguo Yu
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2607. 26933v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) is vulnerable to backdoor attacks because of its distributed nature in edge computing scenarios.
By Hongliang Zhang, Zhongyuan Yu, Guijuan Wang, Tianqing He, Wenshuo Ma, Xiaosong Zhang, Jiguo Yu
arXiv:2507. 05113v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison training data to implant backdoor into the victim model.
By Binyan Xu, Fan Yang, Xilin Dai, Di Tang, Kehuan Zhang
The growing reliance on pre-trained Machine Learning (ML) models has introduced new attack surfaces. Recent vulnerabilities demonstrate that malicious behavior can be embedded within model artifacts, often bypassing existing defenses.
arXiv:2607. 06643v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Backdoor attacks severely threaten large-scale AI models.
By Issam Seddik, Sami Souihi, Mohamed Tamaazousti, Sara Tucci Piergiovanni