arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2508. 04064v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Horizontal federated learning (HFL) backdoor audits often summarize model behavior through clean accuracy (CA), mean attack success rate (ASR), or a single known-trigger test.
By Tuan Nguyen, Sze Jue Yang, Khoa D. Doan, Chee Seng Chan, Kok-Seng Wong
arXiv:2606. 02947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning is the predominant approach for adapting autoregressive vision-language models to downstream tasks.
By Ivan Saboli\'c, Marin Or\v{s}i\'c, Josip \v{S}ari\'c, Sven Lon\v{c}ari\'c
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2607. 05516v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
By Paul K. Mandal, Pavan Reddy, Tristan Malatynski
arXiv:2607. 05516v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
By Paul K. Mandal, Pavan Reddy, Tristan Malatynski
arXiv:2606. 26285v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Noise-based backdoor attacks on diffusion models typically rely on input-time trigger injection, untargeted activation, and out-of-distribution target generation.
By William Aiken, Paula Branco, Guy-Vincent Jourdan, Iosif-Viorel Onut
arXiv:2608. 14861v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Data poisoning attacks pose serious security threats to Federated Learning (FL) systems in Computer Vision.
By Nawrin Tabassum, Yanzhao Wu
arXiv:2606. 15308v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown strong visual reasoning abilities, serving a large model for every query is computationally expensive.
By Zhongye Liu, Yaopei Zeng, Yurui Chang, Lu Lin
arXiv:2507. 05113v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison training data to implant backdoor into the victim model.
By Binyan Xu, Fan Yang, Xilin Dai, Di Tang, Kehuan Zhang
arXiv:2608. 07274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split Federated Learning (SFL) facilitates privacy-preserving collaborative training with reduced client-side overhead.
By Yuhan Xie, Jingrong Huang, Chen Lyu
arXiv:2511. 07210v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Clean-image backdoor attacks, which use only label manipulation in training datasets to compromise deep neural networks, pose a significant threat to security-critical applications.
By Binyan Xu, Fan Yang, Di Tang, Xilin Dai, Kehuan Zhang