arXiv Machine Learning By Kavindu Herath, Joshua C. Zhao, Saurabh Bagchi

Color Matters: Trigger Color Affects Success in Federated Backdoor Attacks

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

arXiv:2606. 25858v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated learning is vulnerable to backdoor attacks in which malicious clients inject poisoned updates while preserving benign-task performance.

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arXiv AI
Aug 26

STAIN-FL: Stealthy Targeted Attack Injection with Contextual Triggers in Federated Learning

The paper introduces STAIN-FL, a stealthy backdoor attack framework for federated video anomaly detection that uses natural surveillance conditions—such as low light, indoor settings, and crowd density—as contextual triggers. STAIN-FL manipulates anomaly labels and masks gradients to keep clean accuracy low while inducing trigger‑conditioned misclassification. Experiments on UCF‑Crime with I3D features show that sparse attacks remain undetectable, drop clean accuracy by less than 2%, yet achieve over 50% backdoor accuracy for hundreds of rounds under FedAvg and FedProx.

By Ashlinder Kaur, Purnima Murali Mohan, Zengxiang Li, Tram Truong-Huu
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.

By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv Computer Vision
Sep 4

Beyond Small Patches: Black-Box Detection and Purification of Diverse Backdoor Triggers

The paper introduces TRIM, a black‑box defense for backdoor attacks in computer vision models. TRIM identifies and removes malicious trigger regions at inference time using region‑based segmentation, adaptive trigger discovery via inpainting and diffusion, and selective purification, without needing model internals, training data, or clean samples. Experiments on various datasets and trigger types show TRIM reduces attack success rates to as low as 1.16% while maintaining high clean accuracy.

By Ahmed Abdelnaby, Mohamed Elmahallawy