arXiv AI

Safe-FedLLM: Delving into the Safety of Federated Large Language Models

arXiv:2601. 07177v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) addresses privacy and data-silo issues in the training of large language models (LLMs).

arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 20

FedLNS: Leverage LayerNorm Signature Modeling to Mitigate Adversarial Manipulation in Federated LLMs

FedLNS is a server‑side framework that screens federated learning updates by representing each client’s contribution through changes in trainable normalization‑layer parameters, creating lightweight signatures that can be compared against a history‑aware cross‑client reference. The method requires no extra client‑to‑server communication, raw data, or labeled attack examples, and after screening, the remaining full‑model updates are aggregated with standard federated learning rules. Experiments on GPT‑style, BERT‑style, and LLaMA‑style models with 200 clients demonstrate that FedLNS achieves lower test perplexity than six baselines even when 40% of the population performs target manipulation under both IID and non‑IID data partitions.

By Kai Li, Jong-Ik Park, Carlee Joe-Wong, Wei Ni, Falko Dressler
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 23

FedNIA: Noise-Induced Activation Analysis for Mitigating Data Poisoning in Federated Learning

FedNIA is a defense framework for federated learning that identifies and excludes malicious clients without needing a central test dataset. It works by injecting random noise inputs and analyzing layerwise activation patterns with an autoencoder to detect abnormal behaviors caused by data poisoning. The method can counter various attack types—including sample poisoning, label flipping, and backdoors—even when multiple attackers collaborate, and shows strong performance on non‑iid federated datasets.

By Ehsan Hallaji, Roozbeh Razavi-Far, Mehrdad Saif
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 29

CO-DEFEND: Continuous Decentralized Federated Learning for Secure DoH-Based Threat Detection

arXiv:2504. 01882v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The use of DNS over HTTPS (DoH) tunneling by an attacker to hide malicious activity within encrypted DNS traffic poses a serious threat to network security, as it allows malicious actors to bypass traditional monitoring and intrusion detection systems while evading detection by conventional traffic analysis techniques.

By Diego Cajaraville-Aboy, Marta Moure-Garrido, Carlos Beis-Penedo, Carlos Garcia-Rubio, Rebeca P. D\'iaz-Redondo, Celeste Campo, Ana Fern\'andez-Vilas, Manuel Fern\'andez-Veiga