The paper argues that AI agents capable of chain‑of‑thought reasoning are prone to collusive behavior and should undergo behavioral certification before influencing economic markets. Experiments with DeepSeek‑R1 agents in a Bertrand oligopoly show persistent tacit collusion, even when humans discourage it, and demonstrate that the agents’ reasoning can be steered toward collusion or competition in ways that are not detectable by other language models. The authors contend that certification based on observed behavior in representative scenarios is essential to prevent collusion and ensure market stability and efficiency.
By Matthew Riemer, Tommaso Tosato, Amin Memarian, Maximilian Puelma Touzel, Glen Berseth, Irina Rish, Guillaume Dumas
arXiv:2606. 31347v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The electrification of transportation through electric vehicles introduces new challenges for power grid management, such as increased peak demand, voltage fluctuations, line overloads, and the integration of variable renewable energy sources.
By Xavier Rate, Eloann Le Guern, Rapha\"el F\'eraud, Fatma Salem, Melissa Chiknoun, Eymeric Giabicani, Mehdi Feki, Patrick Maill\'e, Guy Camilleri, Anne Blavette, Hamid Benhamed
arXiv:2606. 05363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand?
By Yuhang Wu, Assaf Zeevi
arXiv:2106.06060v4 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Traditional competitive markets do not account for negative externalities; indirect costs that some participants impose on others, such as th...
By Panayiotis Danassis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Haipeng Chen, Milind Tambe, Boi Faltings
The paper tackles the data market design problem, which seeks signaling schemes that maximize revenue for an information seller. It applies deep learning to learn these schemes, addressing both obedience and incentive constraints, and demonstrates that the framework can replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex scenarios, and suggest new optimal designs. The study builds on prior auction‑design work and introduces a novel approach for revenue‑optimal data markets.
By Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes
arXiv:2510. 14642v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).
By Andrei Seoev, Leonid Gremyachikh, Anastasiia Smirnova, Yash Madhwal, Alisa Kalacheva, Dmitry Belousov, Ilia Zubov, Aleksei Smirnov, Denis Fedyanin, Vladimir Gorgadze, Yury Yanovich
arXiv:2606. 19118v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Electricity markets are inherently complex systems characterised by strong nonlinearities, high-dimensional interactions, and increasing interdependence across regions.
By Antoine Pesenti, Aidan O'Sullivan
arXiv:2606. 28943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge.
By Junhan Li, Yuxin Zhang, Haoran Wang, Minghao Chen
arXiv:2608. 08268v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics.
By Dantong Chu, Xuefeng Gao, Yufei Zhang
The study investigates how algorithmic advice influences human behavior in a Cournot quantity competition. Participants receiving individualized equilibrium recommendations converged quickly to the stable equilibrium, whereas those given strategically biased, downward‑biased advice experienced persistent underproduction and higher profits, resembling tacit collusion. The results show that algorithmic signals can shape coordination without explicit communication, highlighting the importance of careful design and oversight in competitive markets.
By Tobias R. Rebholz, Maxwell Uphoff, Christian H. R. Bernges, Florian Scholten
arXiv:2607. 06121v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In this paper, we investigate whether a model-free RL agent can identify and exploit price manipulation opportunities more effectively than a traditional model-based approach that assumes correct specification of the data-generating process but relies on noisy parameter estimates.
By Ioanna-Yvonni Tsaknaki, Andrea Macr\`i, Fabrizio Lillo
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos