NashDreamer is a new model-based reinforcement learning framework designed for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model that separates environment dynamics from player strategy effects, enabling the use of any policy gradient algorithm while preserving convergence guarantees to Nash equilibria. Experiments on four benchmark games show that NashDreamer achieves significantly better sample efficiency than model-free baselines early in training, and the authors analyze its optimization landscape, noting a potential vulnerability to posterior collapse in stochastic settings.
By Tom\'a\v{s} Hole\v{c}ek, Viliam Lis\'y
arXiv:2607. 01498v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We investigate the problem of learning useful policy representations (embeddings) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games.
By Kevin Wang, Kevin Yang, Arjun Prakash, Amy Greenwald
arXiv:2605. 29032v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss.
By Christoph Dann, Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri
arXiv:2603. 25464v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Zero-shot reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms aim to learn a family of policies from a reward-free dataset, and recover optimal policies for any reward function directly at test time.
By Jiajun Hu, Nuria Armengol Urpi, Jin Cheng, Stelian Coros
arXiv:2607. 06514v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present FootsiesGym, an open-source environment for learning in a non-trivial two-player, zero-sum, imperfect-information game.
By Chase McDonald, Nathan Tsang, Wesley N. Kerr
We present FootsiesGym, an open-source environment for learning in a non-trivial two-player, zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Built on HiFight's minimalist 2D fighting game Footsies, it isolates the cyclic, non-transitive strategic interactions of fighting game neutral play while remaining simple enough for efficient analysis.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
By Panayotis Mertikopoulos
arXiv:2510. 18183v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
By Eason Yu, Tzu Hao Liu, Cl\'ement L. Canonne, Yunke Wang, Chang Xu, Nguyen H. Tran, Stefano V. Albrecht
arXiv:2606. 23995v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work has established that regularized policy gradient methods such as PPO, when used in self-play, can match or exceed specialized game-theoretic algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games.
By Tristan Maidment, JB Lanier, Chase McDonald, Nathan Tsang, Eugene Vinitsky, Roy Fox, Albert Wang, Wesley N. Kerr
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
By Wongyu Lee, Francesco Lelli, Omran Ayoub, Massimo Tornatore
The paper introduces Bidirectional Behavior Prior Distillation (B2PD), a method that uses action‑value priors to train a conditional variational autoencoder for generating high‑value behavior support. These expert behavior priors are then distilled into the online reinforcement learning agent, reducing inefficient exploration and stabilizing policy updates. Experiments on state‑ and pixel‑based tasks show that B2PD improves sample efficiency while maintaining stable learning dynamics.
By Gong Gao, Xiao Lai, Jiaji Shen, Ning Jia, Xianhui Liu, Weidong Zhao
arXiv:2606. 20008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has become a central tool for improving the reasoning ability of large language models, but current methods face a trade-off between simplicity and credit assignment.
By Zhewei Kang, Aosong Feng, Sergey Levine, Dawn Song, Xuandong Zhao