arXiv:2510. 18183v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
NashDreamer is a new model-based reinforcement learning framework designed for two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model that separates environment dynamics from player strategy effects, enabling the use of any policy gradient algorithm while preserving convergence guarantees to Nash equilibria. Experiments on four benchmark games show that NashDreamer achieves significantly better sample efficiency than model-free baselines early in training, and the authors analyze its optimization landscape, noting a potential vulnerability to posterior collapse in stochastic settings.
arXiv:2606. 23995v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work has established that regularized policy gradient methods such as PPO, when used in self-play, can match or exceed specialized game-theoretic algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games.
arXiv:2508. 04225v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Behavior Regularized Policy Optimization (BRPO) leverages asymmetric divergence regularization to mitigate distribution shift in offline reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2509. 25618v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games.
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
arXiv:2606. 01382v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Preference alignment is central to improving large language models, but standard reward-based formulations can be restrictive when human preferences are cyclic, non-transitive, or otherwise not representable by a scalar reward.
arXiv:2310. 07211v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Regularization is a cornerstone of modern reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2602. 21436v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics.
arXiv:2606. 00367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reinforcement learning problems typically define the goal as maximizing the expected value of a scalar reward function.
The paper introduces Policy Gradient Penalty (PGP), a single‑loop policy‑space method that enforces convex occupancy‑measure constraints via quadratic‑penalty regularization. PGP constructs pseudo‑rewards to estimate gradients of the penalized objective and uses the classical Policy Gradient Theorem, establishing smoothness and global last‑iterate convergence guarantees for an ε‑optimal constrained entropy value with ε‑bounded constraint violation. The authors validate PGP with ablations on a grid‑world benchmark and demonstrate scalability on two challenging continuous‑control tasks.
arXiv:2507. 11366v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains.