arXiv:2510. 18183v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2606. 23995v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work has established that regularized policy gradient methods such as PPO, when used in self-play, can match or exceed specialized game-theoretic algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games.
arXiv:2508. 04225v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Behavior Regularized Policy Optimization (BRPO) leverages asymmetric divergence regularization to mitigate distribution shift in offline reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2509. 25618v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games.
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
arXiv:2606. 01382v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Preference alignment is central to improving large language models, but standard reward-based formulations can be restrictive when human preferences are cyclic, non-transitive, or otherwise not representable by a scalar reward.
arXiv:2310. 07211v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Regularization is a cornerstone of modern reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2602. 21436v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics.
arXiv:2606. 00367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reinforcement learning problems typically define the goal as maximizing the expected value of a scalar reward function.
arXiv:2507. 11366v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains.
arXiv:2605. 29032v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss.
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.