arXiv:2511. 22226v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The standard theory of model-free reinforcement learning assumes that the environment dynamics are stationary and that agents are decoupled from their environment, such that policies are treated as being separate from the world they inhabit.
By Alexander Meulemans, Rajai Nasser, Maciej Wo{\l}czyk, Marissa A. Weis, Seijin Kobayashi, Blake Richards, Guillaume Lajoie, Angelika Steger, Marcus Hutter, James Manyika, Rif A. Saurous, Jo\~ao Sacramento, Blaise Ag\"uera y Arcas
arXiv:2608. 12125v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes.
By Akash Kundu, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker, Samuel F. Brown, Vincent Conitzer
arXiv:2604. 14990v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The prospect of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is increasingly driving institutional decisions, and alignment of AGI is a hard problem.
By Till Mossakowski, Helena Esther Grass
arXiv:2507. 19593v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested beliefs.
By Vince Trencsenyi, Agnieszka Mensfelt, Kostas Stathis
arXiv:2608. 02440v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In noisy social dilemmas, intended actions are stochastically corrupted before execution, so an observed defection may reflect hostile intent or action error.
By Kival Mahadew, Jonathan Shock
arXiv:2402. 08128v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Game-theoretic dynamics between AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways.
By Vojtech Kovarik, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
arXiv:2606. 02859v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control?
By Zhenting Qi, Huangyuan Su, Ao Qu, Chenyu Wang, Yu Yao, Han Zheng, Kushal Chattopadhyay, Guowei Xu, Zihan Wang, Weirui Ye, Vijay Janapa Reddi, Ju Li, Paul Pu Liang, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Sham Kakade, Yilun Du
arXiv:2607. 00001v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Most approaches to AI alignment treat human preferences as fixed targets to be inferred and optimized.
By Max Kanwal, Caryn Tran
arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.
By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Thanh-Bang Cao, Phong-Hao Le, Hong-Dan Nguyen, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Minh-Luan Nguyen-Vo, Hong-Phat Pham, Phu-Hoa Pham, Thien-Kim Than, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Huy Tran, Gia-Thoai Tran-Le, Alessio Buscemi, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv:2406. 14373v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) and advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) offer an opportunity for computational social science research at scale.
By Gordon Dai, Weijia Zhang, Jinhan Li, Siqi Yang, Chidera Onochie lbe, Srihas Rao, Arthur Caetano, Misha Sra
arXiv:2608. 16578v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly operate as part of interacting systems rather than in isolation.
By Batu El, Jinhee Paeng, Fatih Dinc, Shiye Su, Mete Erdogan, Aneesh Pappu, Haotian Ye, Wanjia Zhao, Surya Ganguli, James Zou
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin