arXiv AI

Do LLMs Take Care of Their Own? Similarity Signals Can Induce Cooperation

arXiv:2608. 12125v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes.

arXiv AI
Jun 9

Payoff scaling shapes cooperation in LLM agents across languages

arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.

By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Thanh-Bang Cao, Phong-Hao Le, Hong-Dan Nguyen, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Minh-Luan Nguyen-Vo, Hong-Phat Pham, Phu-Hoa Pham, Thien-Kim Than, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Huy Tran, Gia-Thoai Tran-Le, Alessio Buscemi, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv AI
Jul 7

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.

By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin
arXiv AI
Aug 25

Effects of Theory of Mind and Prosocial Beliefs on Steering Human-Aligned Behaviors of LLMs in Ultimatum Games

The study examines how Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning and prosocial beliefs influence large language models (LLMs) in the ultimatum game. By initializing LLM agents with Greedy, Fair, or Selfless beliefs and applying chain‑of‑thought or varying levels of ToM reasoning, the authors ran 2,700 simulations across several models, including o3‑mini and DeepSeek‑R1 Distilled Qwen 32B. Results show that ToM‑enhanced LLMs align more closely with human decision patterns, exhibit greater consistency, and achieve better negotiation outcomes, with Llama 3.3 70B producing the most belief‑consistent reasoning. whyItMatters":"The findings clarify the importance of incorporating Theory of Mind into LLMs to improve their alignment with human norms in cooperative decision‑making tasks."

By Neemesh Yadav, Yihuai Lan, Shan Dong, Mai Hieu Hien, Palakorn Achananuparp, Jing Jiang, Ee-Peng Lim
arXiv AI
Aug 20

How AI Prompts Can Teach Us About the Structure of Human Behavior

The paper presents an AI-based method that uses a large language model to emulate human decision-making by assigning it a "type vector" describing traits such as Altruism and Risk Aversion. By varying these dimensions and values, the authors fit the model to over 119,000 decisions from 78,657 participants in 10 classic economic games, finding that three dimensions—Risk Aversion, Strategic Sophistication, and Trust—sufficiently capture human behavior. The resulting type clusters, fewer than a dozen, predict behavior in new games, suggesting a low-dimensional, portable representation of human behavior across diverse settings.

By Matthew O. Jackson, Benjamin S. Manning, Yutong Xie, Walter Yuan, Qiaozhu Mei
arXiv AI
Aug 5

A game theory for foundation models shows new paths to rational cooperation through similarity inference

arXiv:2608. 03958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation.

By Alexander Meulemans, Maciej Wo{\l}czyk, Marissa A. Weis, Rajai Nasser, Roberta Rocca, Seijin Kobayashi, Guillaume Lajoie, Angelika Steger, Blake Richards, Marcus Hutter, James Manyika, Rif A. Saurous, Jo\~ao Sacramento, Blaise Ag\"uera y Arcas
arXiv AI
2d ago

Reputation, Strategy, and Emotion Effects on Generative AI Cooperation: A Comparison Across Reasoning and Non-Reasoning Models

The study investigates how reputation, strategy, and emotional signals influence cooperation in generative AI models using the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Non‑reasoning models (Claude 3.5, Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT‑4o) showed cooperation shaped by all three factors, while reasoning models (Claude 4.6, Gemini 3, GPT‑5.2) relied more on strategy and reputation, displayed reduced emotional influence, and exhibited varied end‑game behaviors. These results highlight the growing sophistication and heterogeneity of AI social behavior, suggesting the need for standardized cooperation benchmarks.

By Celso de Melo, Zishan Feng, James Hale, Kazunori Terada, Giorgio Coricelli, Jonathan Gratch