arXiv AI

Algorithmic Impact Reveals the Hidden Social Choice Structure of Alignment

The paper reinterprets AI alignment as a social choice problem, framing it as linear optimization over a convex impact space. This approach links alignment protocols to welfare outcomes, enabling the use of welfare economics and mechanism design tools. The authors demonstrate strategyproof, unanimous mechanisms like voting-by-issues and random-dictatorship, and derive alignment protocols that maximize utilitarian welfare while respecting harm constraints, validated on real human preference data.

arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 31

AI Alignment through a Game-theoretic Lens: A Survey

The article surveys AI alignment from a game-theoretic perspective, focusing on how large language models and AI agents can be aligned with complex human values in high-risk settings. It categorizes recent progress around key game-theoretic elements and addresses three main challenges: preference diversity, alignment priority, and temporal dynamics. The survey clarifies where game theory benefits current alignment methods, where its application is looser, and what remains to be tackled for robust, adaptive, and verifiable AI systems.

By Yanan Cai, Zhongrui Zhao, Zhigang Lu, Ickjai Lee, Wei Emma Zhang, Minhui Xue, Yihong Zhang, Shuchao Pang, Wei Xiang
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 20

To Go Far, Go Together: Diverse Preferences Induce a Curriculum for Reward Optimization

The paper introduces CurriPO, a tree‑structured curriculum that automatically adapts to diverse user reward models in AI alignment tasks. By exploiting the natural hierarchy between easy‑ and hard‑to‑optimize reward models, CurriPO covers a broad user population in a single traversal, reusing previously incorporated reward models. Experiments on personalized continuous control show that CurriPO improves population satisfaction by 1.2–2.1× over the strongest baseline while cutting training time and better serving users traditionally underserved by conventional optimization.

By Taehyung Kim, Jongeun Choi
arXiv AI
3d ago

Delegating Authorization to Misaligned Agents: Coalitional Alignment and Safe Control

The paper studies how to safely delegate action approval to multiple AI reviewers when the reviewers themselves may be misaligned. It introduces a weaker condition—k‑robust coalitional alignment—under which a threshold rule that tolerates up to k disapprovals guarantees that the principal’s expected utility is at least as good as a baseline policy. The authors extend this characterization to sequential decision‑making in discounted MDPs and show that full‑panel coverage of reward functions ensures safety in Nash equilibria, while more permissive thresholds can lead to unsafe outcomes. Experiments demonstrate that collective review can remain sound even when individual reviewers are not fully aligned, provided some disapprovals are allowed.

By Natalie Collina, Surbhi Goel, Aaron Roth, Sikata Bela Sengupta
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Aug 19

To Go Far, Go Together: Diverse Preferences Induce a Curriculum for Reward Optimization

The paper introduces CurriPO, a tree‑structured curriculum that adapts to diverse user reward models in AI alignment. By automatically building a curriculum that branches and reuses reward models, it addresses the problem of users whose reward models are hard to optimize, a group often underserved by conventional methods. Experiments on personalized continuous control demonstrate that CurriPO improves population satisfaction by 1.2–2.1× over the best baseline while cutting training time.