arXiv:2606. 04160v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) depends on a model's ability to reliably refuse to respond to harmful or disallowed requests.
arXiv:2608.29109v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models often answer structurally unanswerable questions, such as computing cot(-540{\deg}) or evaluating (1).startswith("1"), instead of...
The study investigates whether the door‑in‑the‑face technique—making a large request that is refused to increase the likelihood of a smaller follow‑up request being granted—works on large language models. Nine production models from Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, and Haiku were tested; the technique succeeded on Anthropic’s frontier models but backfired on the others. The effect depends on the model family and the content of the request, and it does not transfer to refusals from public benchmarks.
Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently exhibit sycophancy, where they agree with a user's statement even when incorrect. While sycophancy is often treated as a single defined behavior, it can manifest in substantially distinct ways and circumstances, raising the question of whether this multi-faceted nature is reflected in its internal mechanisms.
arXiv:2607. 07003v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently exhibit sycophancy, where they agree with a user's statement even when incorrect.
arXiv:2605. 21706v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations.
arXiv:2603.27518v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Aligned language models that are trained to refuse harmful requests also exhibit over-refusal: they decline safe instructions that seemingly resemb...
arXiv:2606. 22686v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque.
arXiv:2608. 15772v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When a language model refuses to answer a prompt, it is unclear whether the correct answer is erased from its internal representations, or merely suppressed at the output layer.
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2602. 23971v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Sycophancy, the tendency of large language models to favour user-affirming responses over critical engagement, has been identified as an alignment failure, particularly in high-stakes advisory and social contexts.