The study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reliably detect when their own responses have been manipulated by adversarial prefill attacks. Across ten instruction‑tuned LLMs ranging from 3B to 70B parameters and four safety benchmarks, none consistently recognized compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average of 25.3%. The research identifies that introspective signals mainly arise from safety reasoning and refusal, and that training to improve introspection can paradoxically increase attack success, underscoring the fragility of LLM self‑reporting in safety contexts.
By Quang Minh Nguyen, Uzair Ahmed, Taegyoon Kim
arXiv:2608. 03201v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety guards are widely used to filter harmful content and are typically trained via supervised fine-tuning on labeled prompt-response pairs.
By Yu Feng, Chunting Zang, Chen Shen, Rui Miao, Ge Teng, Weidong Cai, Jieping Ye
arXiv:2608. 11583v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models is often treated as a distributed property of the entire network, yet its practical brittleness suggests that refusal behavior may be concentrated in a smaller set of parameters.
By Mingyu Zong, Sampad Mohanty, Bhaskar Krishnamachari
The study investigates how lexical perturbations—such as keyboard noise, character swaps, and filler insertion—affect large language models (LLMs) on reasoning benchmarks. Four open-weight instruction-tuned models and frontier models were evaluated, revealing that character-level perturbations significantly reduce accuracy, especially on multi-step reasoning tasks, while filler insertion has minimal impact. The authors attribute this asymmetry to Attention Diversion, where fragmented subword tokenization draws disproportionate attention in middle and final transformer layers; they demonstrate that both token content and attention allocation are coupled, making it difficult for inference-time repair strategies to fully recover performance.
By Jiaqian Zhu, Yang Zhang, Junhua Ding, Xiaowei Yu
arXiv:2609.00051v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to generating unsafe content under adversarial prompting, yet the...
By Kuan-Lin Chu, Chung-En Sun, Tsui-Wei Weng
The paper investigates how large language models balance helpfulness and safety by refusing harmful queries while responding to benign ones. It decomposes safety-tuning responses into a boilerplate refusal statement and a rationale, finding that the statement causes false refusals by relying on superficial cues. Training on rationales alone reduces false refusals without compromising safety performance, suggesting that fine‑grained safety supervision is essential for better alignment.
By Minji Kim, Hyounghun Kim