arXiv AI By Zixuan Weng, Haoqi He, Weifei Jin, Yue Huang, Yang Bai

Attention Sees, MLP Refuses: Tracing the Attention-to-MLP Safety Pathway in LLMs

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The paper investigates how safety‑aligned large language models (LLMs) can still be tricked by jailbreaks or over‑refuse benign requests. By analyzing residual‑stream updates in decoder‑only Transformers, the authors find that harmfulness is more readily decoded from attention updates—especially in early layers—while the MLP component is primarily responsible for writing refusal responses. Post‑training enhances MLP‑driven refusal writing without improving harmfulness decodability, and causal interventions confirm that downstream MLP updates are crucial for the refusal shift caused by upstream attention changes. Building on these insights, the authors propose Sentinel, a system that combines an attention‑derived perception score with an MLP‑derived decision score to better detect jailbreaks and over‑refusals across multiple models.

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