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arXiv:2606. 22686v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque.
arXiv:2603.27518v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Aligned language models that are trained to refuse harmful requests also exhibit over-refusal: they decline safe instructions that seemingly resemb...
The paper investigates how refusal training shapes the internal geometry of language models, showing that activation updates from refusal-completion losses create a distinct low‑dimensional refusal subspace. In a case study on OLMo‑2‑0425‑1B‑Instruct, the authors link the brittleness of refusal directions to repetitive refusal prefixes and demonstrate that using diverse refusal starts can increase the stable rank of gradients, thereby hardening the model against vector‑ablation attacks. The work provides insights into the emergence of safety‑critical features and offers a potential strategy to strengthen refusal robustness.
arXiv:2607. 16799v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hidden-state readouts can predict whether language-model outputs are correct, but objective correctness (OC) usually agrees with the model's own self-judgement (SJ), leaving the decoded signal semantically ambiguous.
arXiv:2604. 04385v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We localize the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models.
arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.