arXiv:2605. 21706v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations.
By Giorgio Piras, Raffaele Mura, Fabio Brau, Maura Pintor, Luca Oneto, Fabio Roli, Battista Biggio
arXiv:2509. 03647v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as automated evaluators, yet they suffer from "self-preference bias": a tendency to favor their own outputs over those of other models.
By Dani Roytburg, Matthew Bozoukov, Matthew Nguyen, Jou Barzdukas, Simon Fu, Narmeen Oozeer
arXiv:2608. 06578v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier language models are trained using distinct data, objectives, and safety pipelines.
By Ali Jalal-Kamali
arXiv:2608. 12821v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to harmful requests and jailbreak attacks.
By Fangzhou Chen, Shiji Zhao, Mengyang Wang, Qihui Zhu, Ranjie Duan, Maoxun Yuan, Xingxing Wei
arXiv:2607. 02121v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic systems become integrated into real-world applications, ensuring their safety and security is critical.
By William Hackett, Peter Garraghan
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
By Joshua Adrian Cahyono