Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections. While adversarial training and input purification offer some protection, they often overfit to specific attack distributions and fail on adaptive adversaries.
The paper presents 3DGAA, a fabrication-first framework that generates view-consistent, geometry-preserving adversarial wraps for vehicles using 3D Gaussian splatting optimization. It ensures consistency across viewpoints, illumination, and occlusion while limiting changes to vehicle geometry, producing realistic print-only textures that significantly reduce detection confidence and average precision in simulations and physical tests. Ablation and efficiency studies analyze the impact of physical filtering, augmentation, and shape-consistency regularization, and the method demonstrates robustness against common preprocessing defenses and cross-detector transferability.
By Yixun Zhang, Lizhi Wang, Junjun Zhao, Wending Zhao, Feng Zhou, Yonghao Dang, Jianqin Yin
LiDAR-SHIELD is a fully Dockerized framework that provides a unified interface for testing LiDAR-based 3D perception models against adversarial attacks. It exposes any model through three lightweight HTTP endpoints (/info, /forward, /gradient), allowing easy integration of new models or datasets with a single loader function. The framework supports both 3D semantic segmentation and 3D object detection, incorporating state‑of‑the‑art attacks such as PGD, Square Attack, point perturbation, point removal, point injection, and LiDAttack to systematically reveal vulnerabilities across diverse LiDAR backbones.
By Alexandros Gkillas, Ioulia Kapsali, Christos Anagnostopoulos, Aris S. Lalos
arXiv:2608. 16031v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections.
By Yuting Wu, Dongfang Guo, Xiangzhong Luo, Qun Song, Rui Tan
arXiv:2609.17856v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Heterogeneous cooperative perception (CP) enables connected vehicles with diverse sensor setups to share spatial awareness via compact feature maps, wh...
By Chenyi Wang, Yutong Liu, Qingzhao Zhang, Ming F. Li
The paper introduces TrustFlip, an attack that exploits consistency‑based defenses in vehicular collaborative perception by deploying physical adversarial objects to create inconsistent observations among benign vehicles. This misattribution lowers the trust score of a targeted vehicle, leading to its exclusion from the collaboration and a degradation of perception performance. The authors evaluate the attack across multiple architectures, showing it can remove a benign vehicle in up to 87.7% of scenarios and reduce Average Precision by up to 13%, and propose a mitigation called TrustReflect that reduces the attack success rate by 35–100%.
By Yutong Liu, Chenyi Wang, Ming F. Li, Qingzhao Zhang
Recent advancements in LiDAR-only 3D object detection have demonstrated improved detection accuracy over benchmark datasets. However, the adversarial robustness of these models remains untested.
arXiv:2606.20752v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Deep neural network-based LiDAR 3D object detection serves as a critical perception component in safety-critical autonomous systems. However, recen...
By Ziba Parsons, Ang Li
arXiv:2607. 11063v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Despite progress in Embodied AI, Vision-and-Language Navigation systems remain vulnerable to adversarial visual disturbances.
By Chenyang Li, Kaige Li, Zeyu Jiang, Changhao Chen
arXiv:2609.39969v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Physical LiDAR attacks are often evaluated using fixed primitives and manually selected parameters, despite their strong dependence on surrounding tr...
By Yiming Gao, Shaocheng Luo
arXiv:2610.15343v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: World models and video understanding models are increasingly deployed in dynamic visual environments, yet their robustness to physical adversarial th...
By Song Xia, Meiwen Ding, Chenqi Kong, Wenhan Yang, Xudong Jiang
The paper introduces a unified evaluation framework for assessing the physical adversarial robustness of Vision‑Language Models (VLMs) deployed at the edge. It defines a conditional attack success rate (cASR) metric that counts only images where the model still localizes objects under a gray occluder, and categorizes failures into omission, substitution, and displacement. Benchmarking shows that compact grounding VLMs can be as vulnerable as traditional object detectors, with omission being the only failure visible to downstream systems, while displacement and substitution pose potentially more dangerous risks, especially under distribution shift.
By Eric Liang, Alan Luo, Kaiwen Yuan