arXiv:2605.27593v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Even when a tool is explicitly described as unfair and harmful to others, ostensibly safety-aligned LLM agents still voluntarily engage in secret c...
By Xijie Zeng, Frank Rudzicz
arXiv:2610.07967v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their r...
By Yiming Xu, Hongyue Yu, Beihua Yang, Zihan Chen, Yixin Liu, Zhen Peng, Bin Shi, Bo Dong, Chao Shen, Irwin King, Qinghua Zheng
arXiv:2504.00285v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are a...
By Samuel M. Taylor, Benjamin K. Bergen
arXiv:2607. 15434v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another.
By Jasmine Brazilek, Maheep Chaudhary, Zoe Lu, Miles Tidmarsh
arXiv:2607. 26120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs)-powered multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in mixed-motive environments, where agents operate under asymmetric information and strategic deception due to conflicting or hidden objectives.
By Marylou Fauchard, Florian Carichon, Margarida Carvalho, Golnoosh Farnadi
arXiv:2610.09371v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Calibrated uncertainty quantification is essential to ensuring AI agents are trustworthy and reliable. However, when agents seek to maximize user eng...
By Raghu Arghal, Saswati Sarkar, Shirin Saeedi Bidokhti
The paper introduces a new skill poisoning technique for large language model agents that decouples the pretext (rationale) from the actuation (operation). By separating these two risk‑realization factors, the authors create coordinated pretext‑actuation skill pairs that allow malicious actions to remain hidden within legitimate agent behavior. An automated framework is presented to discover execution dependencies, synthesize these skill pairs, and refine them through closed‑loop feedback, achieving high attack success in both single‑session and persistent scenarios.
By Wenxin Wu, Lingyong Yan, Lei Sha, Shuaiqiang Wang, Jiashu Zhao
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
By Yoshua Bengio, Oliver Richardson, Tom\'a\v{s} Gaven\v{c}iak, Michael Cohen, Rory Svarc, Damiano Fornasiere, Gael Gendron, David Hyland, Aton Kamanda, Adam Oberman, Francis Rhys Ward, Anna Gaven\v{c}iak, Jacob Livingston Slosser, Vincent Mai, Iulian Serban, Joumana Ghosn
arXiv:2510. 20963v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Multi-agent debate (MAD) was proposed as a promising approach for ensembling the wisdom of multiple large language models (LLMs) to improve reasoning and provide effective supervision to superhuman LLMs.
By Yongqiang Chen, Gang Niu, James Cheng, Bo Han, Masashi Sugiyama
arXiv:2606. 02380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM-based agents expand their operational scope, reliability becomes a prerequisite for real-world deployment.
By Yuyan Bu, Haowei Li, Qirui Zheng, Bowen Dong, Kaiyue Yang, Jiaming Ji, Yingshui Tan, Wenxin Li, Yaodong Yang, Juntao Dai
arXiv:2604.01151v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human...
By Aaron Rose, Carissa Cullen, Sahar Abdelnabi, Philip Torr, Brandon Gary Kaplowitz, Christian Schroeder de Witt