Semantic communication (SemCom) aims to preserve semantic meaning and task-oriented information beyond conventional message recovery over wireless channels. The adoption of SemCom in shared-access wireless networks introduces new vulnerabilities for multi-user semantic inference.
arXiv:2605. 26595v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison.
By Zedian Shao, Charles Fleming, Teodora Baluta
arXiv:2606. 31973v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Semantic communication (SemCom) has emerged as a promising paradigm in which the transmission of task-relevant information is prioritized over raw data, enabling efficient and robust communication under resource and channel constraints.
By Yalin E. Sagduyu, Tugba Erpek, Aylin Yener, Sennur Ulukus
arXiv:2605. 01133v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-powered multi-agent systems (MAS) enable agents to communicate and share information, achieving strong performance on complex tasks.
By Lingxi Zhang, Guangtao Zheng, Hanjie Chen
arXiv:2511.14301v4 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning def...
By Eric Xue, Ruiyi Zhang, Pengtao Xie
arXiv:2511. 20002v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in stateless systems, such as autonomous driving and robotics.
By Changyue Li, Jiaying Li, Youliang Yuan, Jiaming He, Zhicong Huang, Pinjia He
arXiv:2607. 16414v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are now ubiquitous across domains such as security, finance, healthcare, consumer technology, and large-scale cloud services, where they process massive volumes of data and make consequential decisions daily.
By Maria Mahbub, Steven Young, Amir Sadovnik, Edmon Begoli, Chris Rugenstein, Donald Coulter, Anthony Ayodele
The paper introduces DiffSem, a diffusion-based approach for task‑oriented semantic communications that splits the diffusion process between transmitter‑side self‑noising and receiver‑side reverse denoising. It addresses privacy concerns by reducing model‑inversion attacks while preserving task accuracy, as demonstrated on MNIST, CIFAR‑10, and CelebA datasets. The method achieves higher task performance without enlarging transmitted feature size or increasing semantic leakage.
By Xuesong Wang, Mo Li, Xingyan Shi, Zhaoqian Liu, Shenghao Yang
The paper proposes a neurosymbolic defense architecture for AI-enhanced Security Operations Centers (AI‑SOCs) that protects against indirect prompt injection via log poisoning. It combines deterministic SIEM decoders as a pre‑filter with NeMo Guardrails for semantic validation, and adds a closed‑loop telemetry system for Human‑in‑the‑Loop visibility. Experimental results mapped to the MITRE ATLAS taxonomy show the approach effectively dismantles promptware kill chains and delivers a resilient, observable defense for next‑generation AI‑SOCs.
By Anna Gazani, Spyridon Kounoupidis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Nikolaos Kekatos, Grigorios Tsoumakas, Georgios Koutidis
arXiv:2606. 28649v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present RIPA, the first systematic multi-channel empirical study of prompt injection attacks delivered through the sensory pipeline of a ROS 2-based LLM-controlled robotic system.
By Nima Dorzhiev
The paper introduces Quarantined Expert Shutdown (QES), a new backdoor containment strategy for large language models. QES allows backdoor learning to occur during training but routes it into a designated, quarantined expert that can be disabled at deployment. The method achieves significant reductions in attack success rates while largely preserving model utility.
By Jianwei Li, Min-Seon Kim, Jung-Eun Kim
The paper introduces a three‑layer security framework designed to protect retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) chatbots from both direct and indirect prompt injection attacks. Layer 1 filters user input with rule‑based patterns and a semantic anomaly classifier; Layer 2 enforces a provenance‑based instruction hierarchy during context assembly; Layer 3 audits model output with a policy rule engine and semantic drift detector. Evaluations on GPT‑4o, Llama 3, and Mistral 7B demonstrate a reduction in attack success rate from 71.4 % to 11.3 %, outperforming existing single‑layer defenses while keeping false positives low and latency acceptable.
By Gulshan Saleem, Nisar Ahmed, Muhammad Imran Zaman, Ali Hassan, Umar Mujahid