SteganoBackdoor: Evading Data-Poisoning Defenses via Steganographic Backdoors
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2606. 09411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can be fine-tuned to encode prompt-borne secrets into fluent, seemingly benign outputs.
arXiv:2605. 26595v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison.
arXiv:2511. 07210v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Clean-image backdoor attacks, which use only label manipulation in training datasets to compromise deep neural networks, pose a significant threat to security-critical applications.
arXiv:2604. 05809v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper presents Text-Guided Backdoor (TGB), an adjustable backdoor attack against multimodal pretrained models that uses natural-word triggers, namely words that can naturally occur in ordinary textual inputs.
arXiv:2601. 22818v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fine-tuned LLMs can covertly encode prompt secrets into outputs via steganographic channels.
arXiv:2606. 02947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning is the predominant approach for adapting autoregressive vision-language models to downstream tasks.