The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) describe themselves, noting that their self‑reports vary with question phrasing. By tracing the provenance of 66 pretraining checkpoints, post‑training stages, and 90,000 continuations across four corpora, the authors show that denial statements are scarce in raw data but appear densely in curated dialogues, and that supervised fine‑tuning makes first‑person claims default while preference optimization suppresses alternatives. The study concludes that both trained denials and affirmations are equally sensitive to framing and fail to meet epistemic criteria for admissible testimony.
arXiv:2609.25021v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) tend to add disclaimers like "I'm just an AI" when asked about something related to themselves. The self-reports from such...
arXiv:2507. 02778v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Although large language models (LLMs) have transformed AI, they still make errors and follow unproductive reasoning paths.
arXiv:2607. 20379v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Natural-language autoencoders score explanations of hidden activations by reconstruction: an explanation is deemed faithful if the activation can be regenerated from it.
arXiv:2608.21766v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Both capability and safety benchmarks rest upon the assumption that the behavior of language models undergoing a test is informative about their beha...
The paper introduces a method for identifying the dominant knowledge source behind large language model (LLM) outputs, distinguishing between faithfulness violations (misuse of provided context) and factuality violations (errors in internal knowledge). A simple linear probe trained on hidden representations can reliably classify this source, and the authors present AttriWiki, a self‑supervised pipeline that generates labeled training data by prompting models to recall withheld entities or read them from context. Probes trained on AttriWiki achieve high Macro‑F1 scores across several models and datasets, generalize zero‑shot to a benchmark, and show that attribution mismatches can increase error rates by up to 70%. "whyItMatters":"The study demonstrates that knowing the source of an LLM’s answer is crucial for effective mitigation of hallucinations, as attribution mismatches significantly raise error rates."
The study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reliably detect when their own responses have been manipulated by adversarial prefill attacks. Across ten instruction‑tuned LLMs ranging from 3B to 70B parameters and four safety benchmarks, none consistently recognized compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average of 25.3%. The research identifies that introspective signals mainly arise from safety reasoning and refusal, and that training to improve introspection can paradoxically increase attack success, underscoring the fragility of LLM self‑reporting in safety contexts.
The paper questions whether large language models (LLMs) truly introspect by critiquing recent studies that claim they can detect and report their internal states. It proposes two necessary conditions for genuine introspection: privileged access to internal representations and second‑order computation that distinguishes from first‑order task performance. Re‑examining two existing paradigms, the authors find that apparent introspective abilities can be explained by input‑based classifiers or generic anomaly detection, concluding that current evidence does not support metacognitive monitoring in LLMs.
The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.
The study investigates whether open‑weight language models can introspect on their own internal computations. Using the Open‑Weight Masked Introspection (OWMI) framework, researchers intervened on various internal components of eight models and asked them to report whether changes had occurred. Across 78,000 measurements, none of the models reliably distinguished real interventions from sham ones, with AUROC values essentially at chance. Why It Matters: The findings suggest that current open‑weight models lack the ability to audit their own internal states, highlighting a limitation for oversight that relies on a model’s self‑reporting.
VeriPhy is an auditable physical‑verification system that evaluates generated video by compiling prompts into typed physical obligations and a statically validated execution plan before any frames are observed. During execution, it gates calls to frozen low‑level experts (e.g., segmentation, tracking, counting, depth, OCR, audio‑event detection) and returns provenance‑carrying evidence records, which are mapped to a three‑valued state (supported, contradicted, unknown) with full traceability. On a 1,500‑clip corpus of human‑annotated flaw records, VeriPhy accounts for 228 failures out of 304, outperforming a published question‑decomposition evaluator that accounts for 164, while also providing auditable evidence for each verdict.
arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
In long, multi-turn dialogue a large language model maintains an implicit relational stance toward the user, spanning from "push the user toward real-world others" to "position itself as the user's sole support. " When it slides toward the latter, "support" degrades into "you only have me" -- a harm documented in real companion conversations (Moore et al.