arXiv AI

Can LLMs Introspect? A Reality Check

The paper questions whether large language models (LLMs) truly introspect by critiquing recent studies that claim they can detect and report their internal states. It proposes two necessary conditions for genuine introspection: privileged access to internal representations and second‑order computation that distinguishes from first‑order task performance. Re‑examining two existing paradigms, the authors find that apparent introspective abilities can be explained by input‑based classifiers or generic anomaly detection, concluding that current evidence does not support metacognitive monitoring in LLMs.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 11

Evidence for Limited Metacognition in LLMs

The paper introduces a new method for measuring metacognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs) without relying on self-reports, instead testing how well models can use knowledge of their internal states. Using two experimental paradigms, the authors find that recent frontier LLMs can assess and use their own confidence when answering factual and reasoning questions, and can anticipate and appropriately employ the answers they would give. The study also shows that these abilities are limited in resolution, context-dependent, differ qualitatively from human metacognition, and vary across models with similar capabilities, suggesting post‑training processes influence metacognitive development.

By Christopher Ackerman
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 2

Can LLMs Reliably Self-Report Adversarial Prefills, and How?

The study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reliably detect when their own responses have been manipulated by adversarial prefill attacks. Across ten instruction‑tuned LLMs ranging from 3B to 70B parameters and four safety benchmarks, none consistently recognized compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average of 25.3%. The research identifies that introspective signals mainly arise from safety reasoning and refusal, and that training to improve introspection can paradoxically increase attack success, underscoring the fragility of LLM self‑reporting in safety contexts.

By Quang Minh Nguyen, Uzair Ahmed, Taegyoon Kim
arXiv AI
Sep 2

In-Context Neurofeedback: Can LLMs Control Their Internal Representations through Privileged Access?

The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can control their own internal representations, a question relevant to machine metacognition and AI safety. Previous work claimed such control using neurofeedback, but the targets were not privileged, allowing third‑party inference from prompts. By redesigning the paradigm to enforce privileged access—mirroring human neurofeedback experiments—the authors find that LLMs fail to reliably control these internal representations, indicating that earlier claims may have relied on superficial mechanisms.

By Koshiro Aoki, Ryota Takatsuki, Gouki Minegishi, Yusuke Haruki, Daisuke Kawahara
arXiv AI
Jul 20

Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models

arXiv:2607. 15495v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning.

By Wes Gurnee, Nicholas Sofroniew, Adam Pearce, Mateusz Piotrowski, Isaac Kauvar, Runjin Chen, Anna Soligo, Paul Bogdan, Euan Ong, Rowan Wang, Ben Thompson, David Abrahams, Subhash Kantamneni, Emmanuel Ameisen, Joshua Batson, Jack Lindsey
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Open-Weight Masked Introspection: Measuring What Language Models Can Report About Their Own Computation

The study investigates whether open‑weight language models can introspect on their own internal computations. Using the Open‑Weight Masked Introspection (OWMI) framework, researchers intervened on various internal components of eight models and asked them to report whether changes had occurred. Across 78,000 measurements, none of the models reliably distinguished real interventions from sham ones, with AUROC values essentially at chance. Why It Matters: The findings suggest that current open‑weight models lack the ability to audit their own internal states, highlighting a limitation for oversight that relies on a model’s self‑reporting.

By Emilio Ferrara