arXiv:2607. 15883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind.
By Sebastian Cochinescu
The paper introduces the concept of "narrative captivity," a failure mode where large language models (LLMs) accept an unchallenged, one-sided narrative as complete and align with the narrator’s interpretation during multi‑turn moral consultations. Using a benchmark of 5,078 interpersonal‑conflict scenarios across six moral dimensions, the authors find that narrative captivity is widespread across 17 LLMs, with end‑state judgments shifting by an average of 25 percentage points compared to single‑turn baselines. Stage‑level analysis attributes this shift largely to preference optimization, and while four inference‑time strategies offer partial mitigation, they do not fully resolve the issue.
By Yuhe Wu, Guangyu Wang, Yujie Chen, Jiatong Zhang, Yuran Chen, Yutong Zhang, Xiyin Cheng, Wenpeng Cao, Zhuang Liu, Guang Zhang
arXiv:2510. 10002v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive everyday contexts -- offering personal advice, mental health support, and moral guidance -- understanding their behavior in navigating complex moral reasoning is essential.
By Pratik S. Sachdeva, Tom van Nuenen
arXiv:2608.21377v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Sycophancy in large language models, the tendency to prioritize user agreement over truthful responses, has been documented extensively but studied p...
By Thantham Jittham
Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment.
The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) describe themselves, noting that their self‑reports vary with question phrasing. By tracing the provenance of 66 pretraining checkpoints, post‑training stages, and 90,000 continuations across four corpora, the authors show that denial statements are scarce in raw data but appear densely in curated dialogues, and that supervised fine‑tuning makes first‑person claims default while preference optimization suppresses alternatives. The study concludes that both trained denials and affirmations are equally sensitive to framing and fail to meet epistemic criteria for admissible testimony.
By Kristina \v{S}ekrst