The paper investigates how marketplace guardrails affect welfare in language‑model agent simulations of hotel transactions. It finds that initial reports of large welfare gains disappear when controlling for offer schemas and buyer choice, and that guardrails mainly redistribute rather than increase welfare unless sellers are explicitly forced to produce inefficient bundles. The authors propose a construct‑validity framework to flag invalid or inconclusive policy claims before they are reported.
arXiv:2608. 07538v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts.
arXiv:2606. 03034v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another.
arXiv:2608. 07583v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems route among model-backed advisors, yet a deployer rarely knows before shipping whether routing will help at all.
arXiv:2605. 13909v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation.
arXiv:2610.19832v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reward model overoptimization in RLHF is usually described as reward hacking. We recast it as rent-seeking: the policy, a firm, earns reward from a reg...
The paper compares a non‑generative verifier (Jev) with a frontier LLM (Astra) on 495 human‑labelled claims from LLM‑AggreFact. Both models achieve statistically indistinguishable accuracy, yet Jev is 187‑fold cheaper and admits more unsupported claims. A confidence‑gated cascade that escalates uncertain claims improves cost‑efficiency, though the benefit comes mainly from the escalation share rather than the probability estimates.
The paper examines how an agent’s probability report is evaluated twice—once by a strictly proper scoring rule and again by an approval rule that determines a decision. It shows that when the approval rule is welfare‑maximizing, it cannot be affine, yet the resulting distortion is predictable and can be mitigated by a reserve report that neutralizes the cost of pretending to be the marginal type. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink achieves first‑best welfare, while smooth rules cannot, and the key constraint is the steepness of the rule rather than its smoothness.
arXiv:2607. 10202v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cross-model comparisons read divergence in value dispositions as evidence that language models hold individuated values.
arXiv:2610.19298v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning for code usually rewards passing tests, which a model can do while remaining wrong on the inputs the tests do not cover. A progr...
The paper introduces a deterministic, reproducible e‑commerce environment that pre‑commits customer and trajectory parameters, enabling a simulated consumer to attempt purchasing a target cart with the help of an evaluated model. The environment records every assistant action and state, allowing post‑trial evaluation of specific conversation components and applying penalties based on tool‑call accuracy. Using this setup, the authors benchmark eight open‑weight agents (20B–35B parameters) across 160 trials and 44 metrics, revealing nuanced performance issues such as under‑action, over‑purchase, unsupported product attributes, and poor search that are hidden by overall success rates.
arXiv:2606. 07834v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM judges increasingly turn verdicts into system commitments.
The paper proposes a claim‑specific verification audit for modular agents that replaces aggregate task scores with evidence‑based evaluations. Each agent conclusion is recorded with supporting evidence and classified as supported, unsupported, unresolved, or not evaluated, along with the boundary of validity. The audit employs three tools—oracle policies, perfect component replacements, and verifier‑score tests—to trace value changes, locate lost value, and assess verifier effectiveness, demonstrated on a portfolio‑allocation agent in a synthetic market.