arXiv:2606. 05330v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models can shift human beliefs across high-stakes domains, but most persuasion studies rely on pre/post belief change.
By Jared Moore, Noah Goodman, Nick Haber, Max Kleiman-Weiner
arXiv:2610.33527v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Training large language models (LLMs) for multi-turn strategic persuasion faces two coupled obstacles: (i) realistic simulation of psychologically gr...
By Minqian Liu, Yuexi Shen, Heajun An, Qi Zhang, Pamela J. Wisniewski, Sang Won Lee, Jin-Hee Cho, Lifu Huang
Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior.
arXiv:2608. 11624v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions.
By Nimet Beyza Bozdag, Emre Can Acikgoz, Gokhan Tur, Dilek Hakkani-T\"ur
arXiv:2608.29803v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as proxies for human participants in social simulations, yet whether they update their beliefs...
By Lin Chen, Yitong Chen, Yong Li
The paper presents an agent designed for the GLEE Competition that engages in bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion games against human and AI opponents. The agent combines a classical game‑theoretic solver, an online Bayesian layer for estimating opponent archetypes, and a language model for generating messages. Experiments include 13,200 Monte Carlo games against 11 synthetic archetypes, an ablation study of the opponent‑modeling layer, and an analysis of 9,337 live‑game messages showing a strong correlation between moral rhetoric framing and buyer purchase decisions.
By Hayden Arnold