arXiv:2608. 11624v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions.
Persuasion is a core dynamic of natural language communication, shaping how large language models (LLMs) update beliefs, resolve disagreements, and reach decisions. As LLMs increasingly debate, advise, and think collaboratively with humans and each other, resistance to harmful persuasion becomes a core requirement for reliable behavior.
The paper investigates how explicit reasoning in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) affects their ability to persuade and be persuaded. Experiments on objective and subjective tasks reveal a Persuasion Duality: reasoning boosts an agent’s persuasive power by about 21 percentage points while also making it less susceptible to incorrect persuasion by up to 10 percentage points. However, the study finds that persuasiveness often relies on superficial cues like response length and repetition rather than logical validity, and that persuasion can amplify or attenuate non‑linearly across multi‑hop agent chains. The authors also propose an attention‑guided prompt‑level adversarial argument detection method that improves agent robustness.
The paper introduces the SAST-IR framework to evaluate large language models’ robustness against persuasion attacks in a memory‑less setting, revealing a flaw called "Refusal Inertia" that masks true vulnerability. Using the CP‑Agent and a custom CounterFact‑Strict dataset, the authors demonstrate that simple, diverse attack strategies achieve a 96% success rate, while complex attacks often trigger defensive compliance. The study highlights severe brittleness in current state‑of‑the‑art models when deprived of conversation history.
arXiv:2505. 22961v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising potential in persuasion, but existing works on training LLM persuaders are still preliminary.
arXiv:2606. 31748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training on language models often induces over-refusal: improved safety on harmful prompts at the cost of increased refusal on harmless ones.
arXiv:2607. 20472v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When a user asks a language model something harmful, is it a genuine attack or a misunderstood but well-meaning question?
arXiv:2604.09746v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent e...
arXiv:2606. 18327v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language models (LMs) that faithfully describe their own behavior can more easily be audited, understood, and trusted by users.
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
arXiv:2604. 11666v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.
MADBench is a benchmark that evaluates the security of Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) systems, which allow large language models to exchange and critique answers. The study categorizes attacks into a layered taxonomy aligned with the MAD workflow and tests six attack families across 356 source tasks and 3,958 test cases. Results indicate that while MAD can reduce answer accuracy attacks compared to single-agent baselines, it may amplify unauthorized reads or writes, and even with collusion among agents, the final answer changes from correct to wrong only 28.30% of the time.