arXiv AI

Safe Learning Under Irreversible Dynamics via Asking for Help

The paper presents an algorithm that lets a learning agent ask for help from a mentor and transfer knowledge between similar states, enabling safe and effective learning in Markov decision processes with irreversible dynamics and infinite state spaces. It proves that both regret and the number of mentor queries grow sublinearly over time, using a sequence of three reductions to achieve a general result. The work claims to be the first formal proof that an agent can achieve high reward while becoming self‑sufficient in an unknown, unbounded, high‑stakes environment without resets.

arXiv AI
Jul 10

Provably Optimal Learning Algorithms for Assistance Games

arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.

By Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan, Stuart Russell, Nika Haghtalab
arXiv AI
Aug 21

Adaptive Probabilistic Shielding by Learning MDPs for Safe Reinforcement Learning

arXiv:2608. 19836v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Probabilistic shielding is a technique for safe reinforcement learning (RL).

By Astrid Horn Brorholt (Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark), Maris F. L. Galesloot (Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands), Nils Jansen (Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands), Kim Guldstrand Larsen (Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark), Christian Schilling (Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark)
arXiv Machine Learning
3d ago

Independent Learning of Nash Equilibria in Partially Observable Markov Potential Games with Decoupled Dynamics

The paper investigates learning Nash equilibria in partially observable Markov games (POMGs) where agents cannot fully observe the state. By focusing on a subclass with independent state transitions and a Markov potential game structure, the authors propose an independent learning algorithm that allows agents to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium using only their own observations and actions, without communication. Under a filter stability assumption, finite‑history policies are shown to approximate the POMG sufficiently, enabling a surrogate near‑potential Markov game and yielding quasi‑polynomial sample and computational complexity.

By Philip Jordan, Maryam Kamgarpour
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 7

When Can You Poison Rewards? A Tight Characterization of Reward Poisoning in Linear MDPs

arXiv:2604. 10062v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study reward poisoning attacks in reinforcement learning (RL), where an adversary manipulates rewards within constrained budgets to force the target RL agent to adopt a policy that aligns with the attacker's objectives.

By Jose Efraim Aguilar Escamilla, Haoyang Hong, Jiawei Li, Haoyu Zhao, Xuezhou Zhang, Sanghyun Hong, Huazheng Wang
arXiv AI
Jun 30

Exploration and Online Transfer with Behavioral Foundation Models

arXiv:2606. 29980v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Zero-shot Transfer in Reinforcement Learning (RL) aims to train an agent that can generate optimal policies for any reward function, without additional learning at transfer time, while training only on reward-free trajectories.

By Louis Bagot (SyCoSMA), Mathieu Lefort (LIRIS, SyCoSMA, IRISA, MALT, UR), La\"etitia Matignon (SyCoSMA)