Adversarial Calibration Attack on Autonomous Vehicles
Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Machine Learning.
Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections. While adversarial training and input purification offer some protection, they often overfit to specific attack distributions and fail on adaptive adversaries.
The paper presents 3DGAA, a fabrication-first framework that generates view-consistent, geometry-preserving adversarial wraps for vehicles using 3D Gaussian splatting optimization. It ensures consistency across viewpoints, illumination, and occlusion while limiting changes to vehicle geometry, producing realistic print-only textures that significantly reduce detection confidence and average precision in simulations and physical tests. Ablation and efficiency studies analyze the impact of physical filtering, augmentation, and shape-consistency regularization, and the method demonstrates robustness against common preprocessing defenses and cross-detector transferability.
LiDAR-SHIELD is a fully Dockerized framework that provides a unified interface for testing LiDAR-based 3D perception models against adversarial attacks. It exposes any model through three lightweight HTTP endpoints (/info, /forward, /gradient), allowing easy integration of new models or datasets with a single loader function. The framework supports both 3D semantic segmentation and 3D object detection, incorporating state‑of‑the‑art attacks such as PGD, Square Attack, point perturbation, point removal, point injection, and LiDAttack to systematically reveal vulnerabilities across diverse LiDAR backbones.
arXiv:2608. 16031v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Camera-based object detectors are vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks designed to suppress detections.
arXiv:2609.17856v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heterogeneous cooperative perception (CP) enables connected vehicles with diverse sensor setups to share spatial awareness via compact feature maps, wh...
The paper introduces TrustFlip, an attack that exploits consistency‑based defenses in vehicular collaborative perception by deploying physical adversarial objects to create inconsistent observations among benign vehicles. This misattribution lowers the trust score of a targeted vehicle, leading to its exclusion from the collaboration and a degradation of perception performance. The authors evaluate the attack across multiple architectures, showing it can remove a benign vehicle in up to 87.7% of scenarios and reduce Average Precision by up to 13%, and propose a mitigation called TrustReflect that reduces the attack success rate by 35–100%.