arXiv:2607. 04146v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions.
arXiv:2606. 09499v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: World models have recently seen a rapid growth in both their popularity and capability as more data efficient tools for generating robot training data or simulating real world environments, with many works proposing their integration into the robot learning pipeline.
arXiv:2504. 17070v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Robots need task planning methods to achieve goals that require more than one action.
arXiv:2608. 05715v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding.
arXiv:2601. 04266v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are widely deployed in safety-critical embodied AI applications such as robotics.
arXiv:2601. 14323v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are increasingly deployed in safety-critical robotic applications, yet their security vulnerabilities remain underexplored.
arXiv:2608. 00747v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly integrated into autonomous robotic systems for task planning and control, but this integration exposes them to prompt injection attacks that can lead to unsafe decisions and physical harm.
arXiv:2608. 03231v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies promise general robotic manipulation, but their robustness against physical-world attacks remains fragile.
arXiv:2606. 28649v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present RIPA, the first systematic multi-channel empirical study of prompt injection attacks delivered through the sensory pipeline of a ROS 2-based LLM-controlled robotic system.
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
arXiv:2606. 12299v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models provide a natural language interface to robot control, but the mapping from language to behavior is often brittle and unintuitive: semantically similar instructions can induce drastically different behaviors, while some capabilities may not be elicitable through prompting alone.
arXiv:2607. 19321v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted.
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.