arXiv AI

PentestChain: A Cost-Aware, MCP-Orchestrated Framework for Automated Penetration Testing with Free-Tier LLMs

PentestChain is a ten‑phase automated penetration testing framework that uses a cost‑aware AI cascade, starting with a local 7B‑parameter Ollama model (qwen2.5‑7b) and then free‑tier OpenRouter and Cerebras models, with a rule‑based fallback. It exposes the entire pipeline through a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that includes eleven tools. The authors evaluate the framework using standard testbeds (AutoPenBench, Cybench subset, PentestGPT 182‑sub‑task benchmark) and report that the local model keeps paid‑API cost at zero while detecting 26 services and enriching 34 CVEs on legacy targets.

arXiv AI
Jun 11

Are Frontier LLMs Ready for Cybersecurity? Evidence for Vertical Foundation Models from Dual-Mode Vulnerability Benchmarks

arXiv:2605. 23243v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We evaluate whether frontier LLMs are ready for cybersecurity through a dual-mode benchmark: white-box function-level vulnerability detection (VulnLLM-R, across C/Java/Python) and black-box web application security testing (five production-style applications with 118 ground-truth vulnerabilities across 20+ CWE families, which we will open-source).

By Vivek Dahiya, Sunny Nehra, Vipul Dholariya, Bhavik Shangari, Chandra Khatri
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 10

Layer-Isolated Evaluation: Gating the Deterministic Scaffold of a Production LLM Agent with a No-LLM, Regression-Locked Test Harness

End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where. We present layer-isolated evaluation: a deployed ordering agent is decomposed into a fixed taxonomy of layers (ontology, intent, routing, decomposition, escalation, safety, memory, and cross-cutting envelope/defense), each exercised by its own assertion slice in a deterministic, no-LLM "pure" mode.

arXiv AI
Aug 19

Benchmarking Automated Security Patch Backporting: How Far Are We?

The paper introduces Porting Benchmark, a curated dataset of 1,234 security patch backporting cases that span cross-version, cross-branch, and cross-repository scenarios, along with a common evaluation framework. Five tools—spanning program analysis, LLM prompting, and LLM agents—are evaluated under aligned settings, revealing that performance varies significantly across tools and that complex patches (Type-IV) see a sharp drop in success rate. The study identifies four root-cause categories for failures and demonstrates that reference-based benchmark scores may not fully capture real-world remediation, as executable validation uncovers additional integration issues.

By Jincheng Yang, Yulong Fu, Chengwei Liu, Lyuye Zhang, Fangyuan Zhang, Bingyang Ren, Yang Liu, Hui Li