Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
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PROBE is an algorithm that trains language‑model auditors to probe deployed tool‑using agents for policy violations through realistic, multi‑turn, tool‑mediated dialogue. By framing auditing as a two‑player Markov game and using a composite reward that balances violation discovery, behavioral plausibility, conversation progress, and policy diversity, PROBE outperforms zero‑shot adversaries in uncovering broader and higher‑yield policy violations. The study compares GRPO, DPO, and GFlowNet optimizations, demonstrating that multi‑turn behavioral auditing is a distinct and necessary axis of agent evaluation, complementing existing capability and safety benchmarks.
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