End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where. We present layer-isolated evaluation: a deployed ordering agent is decomposed into a fixed taxonomy of layers (ontology, intent, routing, decomposition, escalation, safety, memory, and cross-cutting envelope/defense), each exercised by its own assertion slice in a deterministic, no-LLM "pure" mode.
arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
arXiv:2607. 08124v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The behavior of an LLM agent is determined not only by the underlying model, but also by its harness: the executable program that constructs context, invokes tools, verifies intermediate results, and recovers from failures.
Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why. We introduce canary tools: diagnostic probe tools planted in an agent's Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool set, each engineered to probe one specific tool-selection weakness.
arXiv:2607. 16345v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems increasingly rely on skills: installable packages of natural language and code that teach an LLM agent to perform a domain task.
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
arXiv:2606. 02822v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM applications stack several defense families -- refusal-phrase filters, token-budget controls, model allowlists, rate limits, tool-registry authentication -- yet existing breach-and-attack-simulation (BAS) benchmarks report a single aggregate coverage number, hiding which family closes which threat.
arXiv:2608. 08029v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Khatri et al.
arXiv:2608. 14863v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based coding agents have advanced rapidly on single-process SWE tasks, with frontier models now clustering in the high-70s on SWE-bench Verified.
arXiv:2606. 16999v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frozen small code models ( =45.
arXiv:2608. 04611v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier coding models now match or exceed strong human reference points on programming benchmarks, yet benchmark success does not imply maintainable software.
arXiv:2607. 23002v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly write both code and the tests meant to check it; coverage records what ran, not what was verified.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.