arXiv AI
From Capability to Assurance in Autonomous Penetration-Testing Harnesses: A Framework and Reference Implementation
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arXiv AI
Jun 18
Code-Augur: Agentic Vulnerability Detection via Specification Inference
arXiv:2606. 18619v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The advent of agentic vulnerability detection is already becoming a watershed moment for software security.
arXiv AI
Oct 2
PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
The paper introduces PACE, a Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement system designed to secure tool-using large language model agents by mediating every tool call before execution. PACE employs path confinement to limit influence paths and verifies effects against authenticated authority, distinguishing certified execution contracts from evaluated configurations. Experiments on eight agent‑security benchmarks show that the evaluated configuration reduces attack success in most cases while maintaining near‑native utility.
arXiv AI
Jun 4
From Agent Traces to Trust: Evidence Tracing and Execution Provenance in LLM Agents
arXiv:2606. 04990v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly solve complex tasks by interacting with external tools, retrieval systems, memory modules, environments, and other agents.
arXiv AI
Jul 3
Safety Testing LLM Agents at Scale: From Risk Discovery to Evidence-Grounded Verification
arXiv:2607. 01793v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks.
arXiv AI
Sep 23
When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems
The paper discusses how large language model agents now act as privileged principals with kernel‑grade authority, yet lack the trusted mediation traditionally required for operating‑system security. It introduces a taxonomy that distinguishes between provenance‑based deterministic checks and content‑semantic checks, identifying a central mediation gap in distinguishing data from instruction and authorized from unauthorized actions. The authors argue that this gap creates an irreducible risk of undetected attacks whenever inputs and actions are not pre‑enumerated, and they propose defenses across runtime monitoring, architectural separation, and authorization while critiquing current evaluation practices. They extend the analysis to AI‑native operating systems where the model itself serves as the arbitration core, outlining design constraints, challenges, and a research agenda.
arXiv AI
Jul 29
Explanation-Bound Tool Execution for AI Agents: Server-Verified Action Claims Without Trusting Model Rationales
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.