arXiv:2606. 11686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where.
By Sawyer Zhang, Alexander Wang, Sophie Lei
arXiv:2607. 08124v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The behavior of an LLM agent is determined not only by the underlying model, but also by its harness: the executable program that constructs context, invokes tools, verifies intermediate results, and recovers from failures.
By Jun Nie, Yonggang Zhang, Jun Song, Qianshu Cai, Dahai Yu, Yike Guo, Xinmei Tian, Bo Han
Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why. We introduce canary tools: diagnostic probe tools planted in an agent's Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool set, each engineered to probe one specific tool-selection weakness.
arXiv:2607. 16345v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems increasingly rely on skills: installable packages of natural language and code that teach an LLM agent to perform a domain task.
By Tejas Singh Anand, Yuet Ying Christina Wang, Wanting Jiang, Steve Masson, Tian Zheng, Bingjie Zhou
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
By Atul Anand, Sourav Chattaraj
arXiv:2606. 02822v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM applications stack several defense families -- refusal-phrase filters, token-budget controls, model allowlists, rate limits, tool-registry authentication -- yet existing breach-and-attack-simulation (BAS) benchmarks report a single aggregate coverage number, hiding which family closes which threat.
By Alexandre Cristov\~ao Maiorano