arXiv:2603. 19864v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Penetration testing, the practice of simulating cyberattacks to identify vulnerabilities, is a complex sequential decision-making task that is inherently partially observable and features large action spaces.
arXiv:2509. 20008v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Penetration testing, the simulation of cyberattacks to identify security vulnerabilities, presents a sequential decision-making problem well-suited for reinforcement learning (RL) automation.
arXiv:2604. 09523v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Training reinforcement-learning agents for cyber defense requires an environment that reflects the operational setting: noisy, partial observations, several defenders coordinating across a network, and an adaptive adversary realized through self-play.
arXiv:2608. 04317v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied.
arXiv:2603. 13026v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents.
arXiv:2608. 15016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Network incident response remains slow and labor-intensive as the defender must infer multi-stage attacks from partial observations and translate recovery decisions into reliable system commands.
arXiv:2512. 11839v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Designing generalizable control policies that operate reliably under changing conditions is essential for robust network services in modern digital infrastructure.
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied. Meanwhile, recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have improved LLM reasoning, but their integration into cybersecurity remains elusive due to the absence of suitable benchmark environments and interaction datasets.
arXiv:2605. 10834v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets.
arXiv:2606. 03344v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model merging composes specialized capabilities into a single LLM by aggregating task vectors sourced from unverified public platforms, exposing a critical supply-chain attack surface: Because any malicious behavior can be encoded into a task vector, and merging grants third-party vectors direct write access to model weights, an attacker-provided task vector can enable or amplify diverse downstream threats.
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.
arXiv:2607. 26998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools.