arXiv:2608. 14856v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Computing Nash equilibria in interdependent security (IDS) games on networks is computationally expensive: best-response dynamics may need hundreds of iterations per instance, and downstream tasks such as auditing, stress-testing, and incentive design often require repeatedly re-solving the game under parameter perturbations.
arXiv:2606. 06480v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition.
arXiv:2606. 11284v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare.
The paper investigates routing games where travelers choose routes based on remembered or surfaced alternatives rather than a fixed set of actions. It introduces a tractable design theory for endogenous recall, linking a finite‑memory micro model—where each traveler updates a memory state via a logit rule and policies like LRU—to a stationary salience model that assigns route‑specific weights. The authors prove existence and uniqueness of a Forgetful Wardrop Equilibrium, develop algorithms for network design under budget constraints, and identify a Recall Braess Paradox where better recall can worsen equilibrium delay.
arXiv:2607. 09993v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial team games (ATGs) with asymmetric information, such as adversarial path-finding, goal search, and reachability games on graphs, require strategies that are robust to hidden opponent types, such as a hidden goal flag, and to deception.
arXiv:2607. 26788v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable.
arXiv:2509. 12484v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We propose a novel neural network architecture, called Non-Trainable Modification (NTM), for computing Nash equilibria in stochastic differential games (SDGs) on graphs.
The paper presents a convergence framework for deep $V$‑learning over a finite horizon $H$, deriving explicit bounds on policy loss by decomposing the Bellman update error into six residuals. It shows how $L^s$ concentrability controls expected $L^1$ loss, quantifies the impact of shared sampling across horizon levels, and provides optimal and near‑optimal sample allocations for statistical error rates. The work also establishes sharp action‑gap bounds under a margin condition, transfers optimal‑gap results to frozen‑iterate gaps, and offers consistency guarantees for generative‑reset approximate‑ERM procedures with exact action scores.
arXiv:2608. 09366v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large-scale learning systems often face the challenge of balancing multiple, potentially competing objectives, such as fairness, accuracy, and latency.
arXiv:2609.23547v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Graph prompt learning enables parameter-efficient adaptation of frozen Graph Neural Networks to downstream tasks through lightweight prompt parameters....
arXiv:2606. 04476v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study the gradient descent dynamics for jointly training both layers of a one-hidden-layer ReLU network to fit a linear target function.
The paper proposes a mean‑field reinforcement learning framework that models rewards and transitions as functions of an unknown low‑dimensional aggregate statistic of a large agent population. By learning this low‑dimensional representation in an offline setting, the authors demonstrate a provable method for obtaining near‑optimal policies. Experiments on a one‑step routing game inspired by supply‑chain problems show that, with a fixed neural‑network size and optimization budget, the learned representation improves reward prediction and the quality of Nash equilibria compared to baselines that ignore population structure.
arXiv:2608. 13212v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Networked systems, from power grids to traffic networks and cloud clusters, carry loads across nodes with limited capacity.