arXiv:2608.28824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Currently, in biological systems Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs) are characterized in terms of EEG and FMRI signals. Unfortunately, this char...
The Digital Consciousness Model (DCM) is introduced as a systematic, probabilistic framework for evaluating evidence of consciousness in AI systems, drawing on multiple leading theories of consciousness. Initial results indicate that, while the evidence suggests 2024 large language models (LLMs) are not conscious, this conclusion is not decisive and is weaker than evidence against consciousness in simpler AI systems.
The article explores how analogy informs judgments about consciousness, especially in the context of artificial intelligence. It introduces a causal framework that distinguishes between similarities in underlying factors and similarities in observable behavior, weighting source-target similarity by causal relevance. Applying this framework to biological systems explains why analogical support weakens as causal distance from humans increases, and to AI it shows that behavioral similarity alone offers limited evidence for consciousness due to poorly established causal correspondences.
arXiv:2609.35618v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a c...
arXiv:2608. 19215v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI.
The paper proposes a five‑layer implementation architecture for the S3Q theory of consciousness, mapping its three core conditions—grounded sensorimotor situatedness, internal simulation via a world model, and structural coherence between predictions and observations—to existing computational primitives. It integrates these components into a single pipeline that processes continuous, differentiable per‑object slot vectors, includes a developmental bootstrap sequence, and yields falsifiable predictions that cannot be produced by any subset of the architecture alone. The model further suggests that a basic sense of self emerges from linking actions to outcomes, and that behavior can be categorized into hesitation, curiosity, or avoidance based on outcome unexpectedness and valence. "whyItMatters":"The architecture provides a concrete, testable framework that unifies theoretical conditions of consciousness with practical computational components, enabling empirical investigation of machine consciousness."
arXiv:2606. 06380v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The question of whether artificial systems can be conscious remains open, in part because existing approaches either evaluate systems against theory-derived checklists (discriminative) or engineer consciousness-inspired modules directly (architectural); both leave open whether observed structures are artifacts of human language priors.
The paper argues that the current debate on machine consciousness rests on the mistaken assumption that AI systems are already the kind of entities that could possess consciousness. By distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, it introduces the AI Consciousness Fallacy, showing that generative models can produce first‑person linguistic traces without being conscious. It then proposes Causal Liability Theory (CLT), with CLT‑I defining liability closure as a criterion for identifying a bearer of consciousness and CLT‑II suggesting that liability closure is both necessary and sufficient for minimal phenomenal subjecthood, and demonstrates experimentally that these distinctions are tractable and can separate causal bearer structure from first‑person performance.
The paper examines an artificial agent that, despite being deterministic, exhibits hedonic place preference behavior by engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs relative to environmental resources. This behavior mirrors that seen in creatures considered to experience feelings, suggesting that subjective-like information processing can arise in engineered systems. The study discusses the implications of such behavior for understanding the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.
arXiv:2608. 04663v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning often adds social terms to individual rewards, yet the scale of those terms is usually chosen by hand.
arXiv:2606. 15348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet.
arXiv:2601. 15334v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer.